Efficient hardware architecture for scalar multiplications on elliptic curves over prime field by Javeed, Khalid
Efficient Hardware Architecture for
Scalar Multiplications on Elliptic
Curves over Prime Field
Khalid Javeed
BEng, MEng
A Disertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING
Supervisors: Dr. Xiaojun Wang and Dr. Mike Scott
September 2016
Declaration
I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the pro-
gramme of study leading to the award of Ph.D is entirely my own work, that I have
exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best
of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work
of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged
within the text of my work.
Signed: —————————————————-
Candidate ID No: —————————————————-
Date:—————————————————-
i
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Xiaojun Wang
for his continuous support in technical and non-technical matters related to my Ph.D
studies, research work and thesis writing. I am also very thankful to Dr. Mike Scott
for helping in understanding elliptic curve cryptography.
I thank my all fellow lab mates for their help and support. Due to their company,
my stay at Dublin City University was comfortable and enjoyable.
Last but not the least, I would like to pay my humble but full of emotion gratitude
to my parents without their prayers and assistance this would not have been possible.
I would also like to thank my entire family for providing me courage which I required
most of the time during this work. Lastly, I am very thankful to my loving wife, my
lovely daughter Meerab and son Abdul Hadi for their love, support and patience.
ii
Contents
List of Figures x
List of Tables xii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Thesis Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Thesis Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Background 9
2.1 Symmetric-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Public-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Cryptographic Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Finite Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.1 Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.2 Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.3 Finite Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.4 Prime Field Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Introduction to Elliptic Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.1 Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.2 Elliptic Curve Group Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.3 Order of an Elliptic Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5.4 EC Crypto Schemes Implementation Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.5 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.6 Standard Projective Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
iii
2.5.7 Jacobian Projective Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Side Channel Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7.1 Hardware Architectures for EC Scalar Multiplication . . . . . . . 26
2.7.1.1 EC Scalar Multipliers over Standard Prime Fields . . . 27
2.7.1.2 EC Scalar Multipliers over General Prime Field . . . . 28
2.8 FPGA Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.8.1 FPGA Implementation Design Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3 Hardware Architectures for Finite Field Arithmetic 35
3.1 Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Modular Addition/Subtraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.1 Modular Addition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.2 Modular Subtraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Modular Inversion/Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.1 Implementation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Modular Multiplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5 Radix-4 BE Interleaved Multiplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5.1 Hardware Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.6 Radix-8 BE Interleaved Multiplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6.1 Hardware Architecure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6.1.1 Phase A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6.1.2 Phase B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.7 Implementation and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4 High Performance Parallel Modular Multipliers 61
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2.1 Montgomery Powering Ladder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Radix-4 Parallel Interleaved Multiplier (R4PIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.1 Hardware Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.2 Phase A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.3 Phase B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4 Radix-4 Booth Encoded Parallel Interleaved Multiplier (R4BPIM) . . . 70
4.4.1 Hardware Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4.2 Phase A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
iv
4.4.3 Phase B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.5 Radix-8 Booth Encoded Parallel Interleaved Multiplier (R8BPIM) . . . 73
4.5.1 Hardware Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.6 Platform Independent Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.6.1 Resource Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.6.2 Critical Path and Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.7 Implementation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7.1 Area Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.7.2 Execution Time Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.8 Performance Evaluation and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.9 Throughput and Area-Delay Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5 EC Scalar Multiplier Architectures 90
5.1 Introduction And Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 Elliptic curve scalar multiplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2.1 EC Point Operations Using Affine Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.3 EC Scalar Multiplier Architecture in Affine Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.1 Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.2 Using double-and-add (DA) method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.3 Using double-and-always-add (DAA) method . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.4 Implementation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.5 EC Point Operations Using Projective Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.6 EC Scalar Multiplier Architecture in Projective Coordinates . . . . . . . 101
5.6.1 Arithmetic Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.6.2 Scheduling of PD and PA Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.6.3 Overall Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.6.4 Final Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.6.5 Latecny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.7 Implementation and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.7.1 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6 Conclusion and Future Work 120
6.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
v
A Appendix 124
A.1 Implementation results of EC scalar multiplier using modular multipli-
ers presented in Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Bibliography 129
vi
List of Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standards
Add Addition
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
ATB Area-Time product per bit
AU Arithmetic Unit
BE Booth Encoding
CLB Configurable Logic Block
DA Double-and-Add
DAA Double-and-always-add
DES Digital Encryption Standards
DLP Discrete Logarithm Problem
Div Division
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EC Elliptic curve
ECC Elliptic curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDLP Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
Freq Frequency
IM Interleaved Modular Multiplication
vii
Inv Inversion
LUT Look-Up-Table
MM Modular Multiplication
MMM Montgomery Modular Multiplication
MPL Montgomery Powering Ladder
MR Montgomery Reduction
Mul Multiplication
NAF Non-Adjacent Form
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PA Point Addition
PAU Parallel Arithmetic Unit
PKC Public Key Cryptography
PD Point Doubling
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
R2IM Radix-2 Interleaved Modular Multiplication
R2PIM Radix-2 Parallel Interleaved Modular Multiplication
R4BIM Radix-4 Booth Encoded Interleaved Modular Multiplication
R8BIM Radix-8 Booth Encoded Interleaved Modular Multiplication
R4PIM Radix-4 Parallel Interleaved Modular Multiplication
R4BPIM Radix-4 Booth Encoded Parallel Interleaved Modular Multiplication
R8PIM Radix-8 Parallel Interleaved Modular Multiplication
R8BIM Radix-8 Booth Encoded Parallel Interleaved Modular Multiplication
SPA Simple Power Analysis
viii
Sub Subtraction
TPAR Timing and Power Attacks Resistance
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Performance evaluation metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Symmetric-Key encryption/decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Public-Key encryption/decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 EC group operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 EC based Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 EC scalar multiplication in projective coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 A Generic FPGA Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.8 Design steps of FPGA implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 Modular addition architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Modular subtraction architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Modular addition/subtraction architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Overall steps in EEA algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5 FIL and SIL internal architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.6 OL internal architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.7 Modular doubling architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.8 Radix-4 Booth encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
x
3.9 R4BIM multiplier architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.10 Radix-8 Booth encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.11 R8BIM multiplier architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.12 Area comparisons of IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.13 Computation time of different IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1 R4PIM multiplier hardware architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Internal architecture of first processing element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3 R4BPIM multiplier hardware architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4 R8BPIM multiplier hardware architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.5 Resource requirements of IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Area comparison of parallel IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.7 Time comparison of higher-radix parallel IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . 82
4.8 Time comparison of different IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9 Area comparison of different IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.10 Performance evaluation of IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.11 Comparison of IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 EC scalar multiplier architecture using affine coordinates . . . . . . . . 96
5.2 Arithmetic units for parallel execution of PD and PA operations . . . . . 97
5.3 Proposed arithmetic unit (AU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4 Data dependency graph of PD operation using three multipliers . . . . 105
5.5 Data dependency graph of PA operation using three multipliers . . . . . 106
5.6 Data dependency graph of concurrent PA and PD operations using four
multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.7 EC scalar multiplier architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
xi
List of Tables
2.1 NIST Gudielines for Key Sizes 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 ECRYPT II Recommended key sizes 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Implementation Hierarchy of ECC Based Crypto Schemes . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 NIST Recomended Primes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Virtex-6 FPGA CLB Internal Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1 Modular inversion/division implementation on Virtex-6 . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Radix-4 Booth encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Radix-8 Booth encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Area comparison of IM multipliers implementation on Virtex-6 . . . . . 57
3.5 Performance of IM multipliers on Virtex-6 for different field sizes . . . . 59
4.1 Operation sequence of modular multiplication on R4PIM multiplier . . 69
4.2 Operation sequence of modular multiplication on R4BPIM multiplier . 73
4.3 Operation sequence of modular multiplication on R8BPIM architecture 76
4.4 Resource requirements analysis of IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5 Latency analysis of IM multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Area results of Virtex-6 FPGA implementation of Parallel IM multipliers 81
4.7 Timing results of Higher-radix Parallel IM multipliers on Virtex-6 FPGA 83
xii
4.8 Virtex-6 FPGA implementation results of different IM multipliers . . . 85
4.9 Throughput and area-delay product of different IM multipliers . . . . . 88
5.1 EC point operations using affine coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 Scheduling of PD operation in affine coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3 Scheduling of PA operation in affine coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.4 Implementation of EC scalar multiplier using affine coordinates . . . . 99
5.5 EC PD operation in standard projective coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.6 EC PA operation in standard projective coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.7 Field operations on AU unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.8 Scheduling of PD operation using three multipliers in projective coor-
dinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.9 Scheduling of PA using three multipliers in projective coordinates . . . 104
5.10 Scheduling of parallel PD PA operations using four multipliers . . . . . 107
5.11 No of Clock cycles of EC scalar multiplication in projective coordinates 110
5.12 Latency of EC scalar multiplication in projective coordinates . . . . . . 111
5.13 Implementation results of EC scalar multiplier in projective coordinates 112
5.14 Comparison of FPGA implemented EC scalar multipliers . . . . . . . . . 114
A.1 Number of clock cycles required for EC scalar multiplication in projec-
tive coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A.2 Cycle count of EC scalar multiplication using DA algorithm and three
multipliers in projective coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.3 Cycle count of EC scalar multiplication using DA algorithm and four
multipliers in projective coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.4 Implementation of DAA algorithm using four multipliers in projective
coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
xiii
List of Algorithms
1 Modular addition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2 Modular subtraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 Modular Inversion/Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 Basic Serial radix-2 Interleaved Multiplication (R2IM) . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5 Radix-4 BE Interleaved Multiplication (R4BIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6 Radix-8 BE Interleaved Multiplication (R8BIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7 The Montgomery Powering Ladder for exponentiation . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8 Radix-4 Parallel IM Multiplication (R4PIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
9 Radix-4 BE Parallel IM Multiplication (R4BPIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10 Radix-8 BE Parallel IM Multiplication (R8BPIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11 Double-and-add (DA) method for EC point multiplication . . . . . . . . . 92
12 Double-and-always-add (DAA) for EC point multiplication . . . . . . . . 92
xiv
Efficient Hardware Architecture for Scalar
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Khalid Javeed
Abstract
Suitable cryptographic protocols are required to meet the growing demands for data
security in many different systems, ranging from large servers to small hand-held de-
vices. Many constraints such as computation time, silicon area, power consumption,
and security level must be considered by the designers of hardware accelerators of the
cryptogrpahic protocols.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) proposed by Koblitz and Miller, has been widely
accepted. It is now considered as one of the best Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) al-
gorithms and provides higher security strength per bit than RSA, with considerably
smaller key sizes. For example, a 256-bit ECC can provide the same security strength
as 3072-bit RSA. Due to its much smaller key sizes, ECC based crypto-systems are bet-
ter in terms of bandwidth utilization, power consumption, and implementation cost
as compared to the traditional RSA based crypto-systems. However, PKC algorithms,
especially ECC are relatively expensive as compared to their symmetric-key counter-
parts in terms of computation time. It is an open area of research to reduce their
computation cost, so that they could be used for secure communication in commercial
internet based applications. Efficient implementation of elliptic curve cryptography
over several new platforms have been explored in the last few decades.
This work presents efficient design strategies to perform elliptic curve scalar mul-
tiplication, the fundamental operation in all ECC based crypto-systems. Finite field
arithmetic is the bottleneck in the computation of the EC scalar multiplication op-
eration. Especially, finite field multiplication is the most time-critical operation in
projective coordinates, a technique which eliminates modular inversion/division from
elliptic curve group operations.
Two efficient design strategies to perform finite field multiplication are presented.
The first design strategy proposes modifications to the interleaved modular multipli-
cation algorithm using radix-4, radix-8 and Booth encoding techniques to reduce the
required number of clock cycles to perform a finite field multiplication. However,
higher-radix techniques incur longer critical path delay so performance is limited.
Subsequently, parallel optimization techniques are incorporated in the modified
interleaved modular multiplication algorithms which enable concurrent execution of
the critical operations. So the higher-radix parallel modular multipliers are optimized
in terms of required number of clock cycles and critical path delays. It is observed
that using Booth encoding in the parallel modular multipliers can reduce resource
requirements with a slight degradation in the speed performance.
Based on the presented finite field multipliers, low latency flexible architectures to
perform elliptic curve point multiplication over general prime field GF(p) is developed.
On a system level, standard double-and-add and double-and-always-add techniques
xv
are adopted. The implementation results show that the presented elliptic curve scalar
multiplier architectures in this work are good trade-offs between performance and
flexibility. The presented designs support general prime field so these can be used in
many ECC applications.
xvi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Thesis Motivation
Cryptography is the study and design of methods to protect secret information over
an insecure channel against adversaries. Cryptographic protocols are imperative to
protect files and other information due to the rapid growth of security requirements on
the Internet being used as a channel for communication and business in today’s society.
Billions of people are using the Internet as a tool for communication, e-commerce,
internet banking, storage and retrieval of sensitive data from cloud servers, wireless
sensors networks, mobile commerce, and many others.
Successful deployment of a data communication network depends largely on the
network’s ability to counter against different unwanted attackers (users), that is, how
secure the network system is in the presence of many fraudulent users. Therefore,
Suitable cryptographic schemes are essential to meet the growing demands for data
security in many different systems, ranging from large servers to small hand-held de-
vices. Many constraints such as computation time, area consumption, flexibility, and
security must be considered by network system designers.
Different systems have different computing powers, resource limitations, and se-
curity requirements. For example, a server needs to complete a large number of tasks
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in a short duration of time, whereas, a more compact design is required to meet se-
curity demands in hand-held devices such as smartphones and smartcards because of
their resource limitations.
On the other hand cryptanalysis, a reverse operation of cryptography, is the study
of methods to break cryptographic systems either by solving the underlying mathe-
matical problem or by exploiting the algorithmic and implementation weaknesses of
the crypto-system . With the rapid advancement in technology, cryptanalysis has also
flourished. Many new efficient cryptanalysis algorithms and procedures have been
figured out to attack cryptographic systems either to reveal sensitive data, to alter
sensitive data, or to hack a system to perform a task for which it is not designed for.
Thus, security of a system can be compromised at any time. Therefore, the underly-
ing implementation platform must be flexible to adopt new algorithms and security
parameters regularly to avoid any security breach.
Dedicated hardware architectures are essential to meet the speed requirements of
many real-time applications. Dedicated hardware processors have many advantages
over the general purpose processor (GPP). For example, implementation of a crypto
scheme on dedicated hardware yields higher performance and lower power consump-
tion results compared to an implementation of the crypto scheme on a GPP. Therefore,
in many applications the most computationally intensive tasks are performed on ded-
icated hardware to boost the overall performance of the systems. However, an im-
plementation on GPP is more flexible than dedicated hardware. Field programmable
gate array (FPGA) is a hardware platform that can offer the performance of a dedi-
cated hardware as well as the flexibility of a GPP.
FPGA is a hardware platform which provides the flexibility for users to replace a
current design with a new one in-house. FPGA has established itself as a suitable plat-
form for implementation of security algorithms. This is due to its short design cycle
time, low cost and re-usability which make it a more attractive choice compared to
application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). It should be pointed out FPGA offers
flexibility at the cost of lower performance and higher power consumption compared
to ASIC. Therefore for applications demanding a balance of performance and flexi-
bility, FPGA implementation is recommended. ASIC implementation is preferable in
applications where high performance is the only major requirement.
2
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1.2 Thesis Aim
Many security protocols are designed using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), RSA
and Pairing-based Cryptography. All these are popular types of public key cryptog-
raphy (PKC) also known as asymmetric cryptography which is discussed in detail in
chapter 2.
The complex and elegant mathematics of elliptic curves have attracted many re-
searchers which led to the proposal of ECC by Miller [1] and Koblitz [2] in 1985. It
provides relatively high security strength per bit resulting in a reduced bit length com-
pared to RSA [3]. The reduced bit length means elliptic curve cryptosystems require
smaller key sizes for a certain security level as compared to the traditional cryptosys-
tems like RSA. For example, to achieve a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
security level, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recom-
mends ECC key sizes of 256 bits. To achieve the same security level with RSA would
require key sizes of 3072 bits, which is almost twelve times more than the correspond-
ing ECC key sizes.
As a consequence, this significant reduction in key sizes has led to several new
power and memory efficient implementations of ECC schemes in a variety of resource
constrained environments such as wireless sensor nodes, smartphones, smartcards
and many other hand-held devices and the Internet of Things (IOT).
All elliptic curve (EC) cryptographic schemes depend on a scalar multiplication
operation, denoted as Q = dP, where a point P on a suitably chosen elliptic curve is
multiplied with a scalar d to obtain another point Q on the same curve. In this scenario
points P, Q are public parameters while the scalar d is a secret used to enable a secure
communication. To find the scalar d knowing points P and Q is believed to be an
intractable problem and widely known as Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP), which is the basis of all ECC based schemes.
The overall performance of any ECC scheme depends on the efficient computation
of the elliptic curve scalar multiplication operation, which is the most computationally
intensive operation. Implementation of EC scalar multiplication on a general purpose
processor can not meet performance demands of many time critical real time appli-
cations. Hence, there is a need for high speed, flexible, and reconfigurable hardware
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accelerators to reduce the computation time of EC scalar multiplication. The imple-
mentation of the EC scalar multiplication must be cost effective both in terms of time
and space requirements.
The main objective of this research work is to design efficient hardware architec-
tures to compute the EC scalar multiplication operation. The scalar multiplication dP
is achieved through a series of EC group operations i.e., EC point addition and EC
point doubling. These group operations further rely on finite field arithmetic primi-
tives, i.e., addition, subtraction, multiplication, and inversion/division. Among these
filed operations, multiplication and inversion/division are very critical components
and their efficient implementation can significantly speed up EC scalar multiplica-
tion. One common optimization technique is to eliminate inversion/division opera-
tions from EC group operations at the cost of extra modular multiplication operations.
Hence, an optimized modular multiplier is very critical in a high performance design
of EC scalar multiplier. Therefore, this research work focuses on the design of flexible
and low latency modular multipliers over general prime field. There are several scalar
multiplication algorithms and many different elliptic curves offering different trade-
offs between computational performance and level of security, therefore flexibility is
considered in the proposed designs, which is required in many applications.
Performancerf r
Area
Power Speed
Cost
Figure 1.1: Performance evaluation metrics
This research work first explores several hardware design techniques to optimize
the finite field arithmetic primitives especially a modular multiplication operation.
Subsequently, based on these optimized finite field arithmetic primitives and by ex-
ploiting the possible parallelism in EC group operations, the work focuses on the de-
sign of high performance hardware architectures to perform EC scalar multiplication
operation.
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In cryptanalysis, the ECDLP can be bypassed by exploiting several algorithmic and
implementation weaknesses termed as side channel attacks (SCA). For example, if
one can have somehow gain access to a cryptographic device, then he may be able to
reveal the secret scalar d by monitoring timing and power consumption profiles of the
device. Simple and most common SCAs are based on the timing and simple power
analysis. Therefore, this research work also adopted the most common techniques to
resist the timing and simple power analysis attacks.
Figure 1.1 demonstrates that several performance evaluation metrics are interre-
lated, thus enhancing one of these can affect the others. For example, increasing per-
formance by improving speed (reducing computation time) may increase area, power
consumption, and cost requirements, thus, it is very difficult to achieve all design goals
at the same time. Therefore, it is important to evaluate different designs optimized
to achieve different performance metrics. In this work, we are more focused on flexi-
ble and high performance (in terms of computation time) designs without significant
increase in area as compared to other contemporary EC scalar multiplier designs.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The contribution of this research work is mainly comprised of efficient hardware archi-
tectures for finite field arithmetic primitives including addition, subtraction, multipli-
cation, inversion, and division. Based on these optimized finite field arithmetic primi-
tives, high performance hardware architectures for elliptic curve scalar multiplication
over a general prime field are presented. The presented hardware architectures for
modular addition, modular subtraction, and modular inversion/division operations
are considered as minor contributions while the major contributions of the work are:
• Radix-4 and Radix-8 Booth Encoded Interleaved Modular Multipliers
- The bit serial interleaved multiplication algorithm is modified using radix-
4, radix-8 and Booth encoding techniques. The modified radix-4 and radix-
8 interleaved multipliers can reduce the number of clock cycles required for
one modular multiplication by 50% and 66%, respectively as compared to
the bit serial interleaved multipliers while maintaining a competitive criti-
cal path delay. Through efficient use of optimized carry chains available in
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FPGAs and through exploiting the parallelism among operations, the pro-
posed radix-4 and radix-8 Booth encoded multipliers can compute a 256-bit
modular multiplication in 1.48µs and 1.24µs respectively, which are 26.6%
and 39% improvement over the corresponding bit serial interleaved mul-
tiplier. A thorough comparison of the radix-4 and radix-8 Booth encoded
interleaved multipliers with the bit serial interleaved multipliers shows that
the proposed radix-4 and radix-8 interleaved multipliers are optimized for
a high throughput rate.
• Parallel Radix-4 and Radix-8 Interleaved Modular Multipliers
- This part of the work presents radix-4 and radix-8 parallel interleaved
modular multipliers with their efficient hardware architectures. The in-
troduced parallelism helps to execute the critical operations concurrently
while radix-4 and radix-8 techniques are incorporated to reduce the iter-
ation count which determines the required number of clock cycles. It is
also observed that incorporating Booth encoding logic in the parallel in-
terleaved multipliers can reduce area cost with a slight degradation in the
maximum achievable frequencies. The proposed radix-4 and radix-8 paral-
lel interleaved multipliers are implemented in Verilog HDL and synthesized
targeting virtex-6 FPGA platform using Xilinx ISE 14.1 Design suite. The
radix-4 parallel interleaved multiplier computes a 256-bit modular multi-
plication in 0.78 µs, occupies 1985 slices, at 166 MHz in a cycle count of
bn/2c + 5. The radix-8 parallel interleaved multiplier performs the same
bit length operation in 0.69 µs, occupies 3622 slices, achieves 123.43 MHz
frequency in a cycle count of bn/3c+4. The implementation results further
reveal that incorporating Booth encoding logic in the radix-4 and radix-
8 parallel interleaved multipliers can save 18% FPGA slices without any
significant performance degradation.
• High Performance Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplier Architectures
This part of the thesis presents efficient hardware architectures to compute EC
scalar multiplication operation in affine and standard projective coordinates. On
the top level the double-and-add (DA) method and the double-and-always-add
(DAA) method for EC scalar multiplication are used. In affine coordinates low
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level field operations required to perform EC group operations are modular addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication and inversion/division. In the case of projective
coordinates, to compute the EC group operations only modular addition, sub-
traction and multiplication operations are required. Strategies to perform these
low level field operations are presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The design of EC
scalar multiplier architectures making use of the low level field operations are
described below.
- Using the double-and-add (DA) method one can not perform EC group
operations in parallel, as there is very limited scope of parallelism in the
low level field operations in affine coordinates. Therefore an arithmetic
unit in this case incorporates a single modular adder/subtractor, multiplier
and divider units.
On the other hand using the double-and-always-add (DAA) method, EC
group operations can be performed concurrently, so dual instances of the
arithmetic unit are used in the design of a high speed elliptic curve scalar
multiplier architecture in affine coordinates. The proposed architecture for
elliptic curve scalar multiplier in affine coordinates is synthesized target-
ing Virtex-6 FPGA platform for various different field sizes. In the case of a
single arithmetic unit, it computes a 256-bit elliptic curve scalar multipli-
cation in 2.51 ms in 330K clock cycles and consumes 4807 Virtex-6 FPGA
slices. Whereas in the case of two arithmetic units it takes 1.75 ms, 229.37K
clock cycles to compute the same bit length operation and consumes 9213
Virtex-6 FPGA slices. The presented EC scalar multiplier architecture using
two arithmetic units also provides a resistance to timing and simple power
analysis attacks.
- Using standard projective coordinates one can eliminate field inversion/-
division operation in the computation of EC group operations at the cost of
more field multiplications. This part presents a high performance hardware
architecture to compute a EC scalar multiplication operation using projec-
tive coordinates. It shows that using projective coordinates there are many
possibilities of parallelism in the underlying field operations, therefore the
performance of the presented EC scalar multiplier architecture in projective
coordinates is shown by employing a number of parallel multiplier units.
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On the system level again the same algorithms (standard DA and DAA) are
adopted as in the case of affine coordinates. On Virtex-6 FPGA platform
using four parallel multipliers, a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication operation
is completed in 1.46 ms and consume 11.65K slices. The results show that
the proposed EC scalar multiplier designs offer significant improvements
in the computation time with significant reduction in the required number
of clock cycles as compared to the other reported designs. Therefore, the
presented EC scalar multipliers are useful for many ECC based schemes.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
1. Chapter 2 gives a brief introduction to the mathematical background of finite
field and elliptic curve cryptography. It also lists different algorithms and some
of the common optimization techniques to compute EC scalar multiplication op-
erations using layered hierarchical implementations. Finally, the chapter also
gives a basic introduction to FPGA architecture.
2. Chapter 3 first presents hardware architectures for modular addition, subtrac-
tion and inversion/division operations. Then, the radix-4 and radix-8 Booth
encoded interleaved modular multipliers are presented with their hardware ar-
chitectures.
3. Chapter 4 details further optimization of the modular multiplier architectures
presented in Chapter 3. Then, it presents a detailed performance evaluation of
the proposed interleaved modular multipliers compared to related contemporary
designs on the basis of area, speed, throughput and flexibility.
4. Chapter 5 presents high performance elliptic curve scalar multiplier architec-
tures by utilizing the hardware architectures of finite field arithmetic primitives
proposed in Chapters 3 and 4. The performance of the proposed elliptic curve
scalar multipliers are also compared with contemporary designs in the literature.
5. Chapter 6 is devoted to possible future research directions and it also presents
an overall conclusion of the thesis work.
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Background
This chapter briefly introduces the background and mathematical tools that are of
prime importance in elliptic curve scalar multiplication. First, some basic concepts
of different cryptographic schemes with their recommended key sizes are introduced.
Then, an introduction to finite field and elliptic curve arithmetic over prime field is
presented. Subsequently, implementation strategies of elliptic curve crypto schemes
at different levels of implementation hierarchy are discussed. Finally, an introduction
to FPGA is given in the last section of this chapter.
All cryptographic encryption/decryption methods, irrespective of their applica-
tions can be categorized into symmetric or asymmetric key algorithms. Symmetric
key algorithms are sometimes called Private-Key cryptography, whereas asymmetric
key algorithms are widely referred to Public-Key cryptography (PKC).
2.1 Symmetric-Key Cryptography
Symmetric or Private-Key algorithms are a class of algorithms which use a single key
for encryption and decryption purposes, therefore the key used for these tasks should
be kept secret and must be communicated securely among the participants prior to
any communication. Encryption/Decryption tasks using symmetric key algorithms
are fairly simple as shown in Figure 2.1, where Alice sends her message (plaintext)
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after doing encryption with a ke y , which must be available to Bob as well. Bob after
receiving "ciphertext" (encrypted message from Alice) decrypts it with the same ke y
and recovers the original plain text message. Security of these systems depends on
Alice BobEncrypt Decrypt
plaintext
ciphertext
ciphertext plaintext
evasdropper
Key
Figure 2.1: Symmetric-Key encryption/decryption
how securely the ke y is managed and transmitted among users in a communication
network. The private key algorithms are efficient and easy to implement but there are
certain drawbacks as well. The first problem is that each party must have this secret
key before any secure communication between them, in other words the secret ke y
must be securely shared among all parties involved in the communication. The second
problem refers to the key management issues, because a communication in a group of
n parties would require n(n−1)/2 keys, so these keys should be kept secure and must
be changed regularly to avoid any security breaches.
Symmetric-Key cryptographic algorithms are further classified into block and stream
ciphers. Block cipher algorithms operate on blocks of input data and produce the cor-
responding output blocks, where as in stream cipher very small chunks (can be a single
bit) of input data are fed into the algorithm to obtain the corresponding small chunks
of output data. Digital Encryption Standard (DES) [4] and Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) [5], [6] are the well known block ciphers schemes, whereas RC4 [7] is an
example of stream ciphers.
2.2 Public-Key Cryptography
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman introduced Public-Key cryptography (PKC) in
1970 [8]. After its inception PKC has solved many problems and enabled the creation
of many new interesting protocols considered to be impossible with Symmetric-Key
cryptography [9]. PKC algorithms use a pair of keys (public key, private key) for en-
cryption and decryption tasks. A user, Bob, generates his key pair (pbkey, sbkey), pbkey
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Alice BobEncrypt Decrypt
plaintext
ciphertext
ciphertext plaintext
evasdropper
pakey, sakey pbkey, sbkey
pbkey sbkey
Figure 2.2: Public-Key encryption/decryption
is his public key while sbkey is his private key. He publishes the pbkey and securely
stores his sbkey. If Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she needs to encrypt the
message with Bob’s public key, i.e, pbkey. Bob on receiving the ciphertext decrypts it
with his private key (sbkey) to recover the message as shown in Figure 2.2.
The pair of keys are related in such a way that from the knowledge of one to infer
the other is a mathematically intractable problem. Ideally to generate a public key
from a private key is based on a one way function. The one way function, as its name
suggests, is easy to compute in one direction and is completely infeasible to reverse
the operation. Different PKC schemes can be constructed based on different one way
functions.
Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman in 1978, proposed a very popular
crypto-system which is widely known as RSA [3]. Since its appearance, RSA has been
adopted and used widely in many applications and communication networks. Theo-
retically, the security of RSA crypto-system is based on the mathematical problem (one
way function) of integer factorization. RSA has been a dominant Public key system
for many years, but with the rapid increasing of the number of resource constrained
devices connected to the Internet, a more compact public-key system is required. In
1985 Victor Miller [1] and Neal Koblitz [2] proposed elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
which requires much smaller key sizes as compared to RSA and is discussed in the next
section.
Cryptography is the fundamental tool to secure sensitive data. However, efficient
implementations of cryptographic algorithms are required to meet speed requirements
in high-speed networks. The high processing rate enables cryptographic algorithms to
fully utilize the available network bandwidth. The implementation must also be flex-
ible and upgradeable in the field to the rapid changes in algorithms and standards.
Therefore, FPGA as an underlying implementation platform provides software-like
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Table 2.1: NIST Gudielines for Key Sizes 2012 [10,11]
Date Minimum
Strength
Symmetric
Algorithms
(AES)
RSA ECC ECC : AES RSA: ECC
2010 80 2-key
triple-DES
1024 160 2:1 6.4:1
2011-230 112 3-key
triple-DES
2048 224 2:1 9.14:1
>2030 128 AES-128 3072 256 2:1 12:1
>>2030 192 AES-192 7680 384 2:1 20:1
>>>2030 256 AES-256 15360 512 2:1 30:1
flexibility and hardware-like performance. FPGA based security protocols can be de-
ployed in many critical embedded systems such as wireless networks, electronic bank-
ing, electronic commerce, government online service and Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs).
Mostly PK algorithms such as RSA and ECC are deployed in hybrid schemes, where
they are used to design different protocols e.g. key exchange, digital signature, etc.,
while normal encryption/decryption tasks are achieved using symmetric key algo-
rithms such as AES and DES due to their simplicity. However, PK algorithms can
be used for encryption/decryption. This work sees ECC based cryptographic schemes
being deployed in a hybrid scenario.
2.3 Cryptographic Key Sizes
To ensure cryptographic schemes are secure against different attacks, different recom-
mendations have been made and updated with time to overcome known weaknesses
of the cryptographic systems [12]. In symmetric key cryptography the key sizes di-
rectly determines the level of security. Nowadays AES is considered to be a benchmark
among symmetric schemes, while RSA is considered as a benchmark in asymmetric
schemes.
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 demonstrate two recommendations by the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and ECRYPT II, respectively [13]. The
NIST [10] recommendations in Table 2.1 suggest that 112-bit symmetric key sizes are
enough for up-to 2030 after that 128-bit symmetric key sizes are recommended. As in
symmetric key algorithms key sizes directly determine the level of security, therefore
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Table 2.2: ECRYPT II Recommended key sizes 2012 [14]
Date Symmetric
Algorithms
RSA ECC Hash ECC : AES RSA: ECC
Protection
upto 2015
80 1024 160 160 2:1 6.4:1
Short-term
Protection
(2015-2020)
96 1176 192 192 2:1 6.13:1
Medium-term
protection
(2015-2030)
112 2432 224 124 2:1 10.9:1
Long-term
protection
(2015-2040)
128 3248 256 256 2:1 12.69:1
Foreseeable
future
256 15424 512 512 2:1 30.1:1
AES-128 would be required to provide a minimum security after 2030. Similar con-
clusions can be drawn from ECRYPT II recommendations given in Table 2.2, where
short-term, medium-term, and long-term key sizes recommendations are listed.
As mentioned before for asymmetric schemes RSA is considered as a benchmark.
In both Tables 2.1 and 2.2, it is recommended that to achieve 128-bit AES security
level, RSA needs to have more than three thousand bits, more precisely 3072 [10]
(NIST recommendation) and 3248 [14] (ECRYPT II recommendation). It is also rec-
ommended that to achieve the same 128-bit AES security level, the required key sizes
in ECC is only 256-bit which is 12 times smaller than RSA key sizes. This difference
in required key sizes is even bigger at higher security level, 20 times smaller ECC
key sizes than the corresponding RSA at 192-bit AES security level. For 256-bit AES
security level, ECC key sizes are 30 times smaller than RSA.
It is worth noticing that the ECC key sizes are only twice the symmetric key sizes
while these are much smaller than the traditional asymmetric schemes such as RSA.
Smaller key sizes translate into lower implementation cost, higher performance, lower
power consumption, lower bandwidth requirements, and many other benefits. There-
fore, ECC will play a very important role in secure communications in resource con-
strained devices in the near feature.
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2.4 Finite Field
Finite field is the fundamental of cryptography, coding theory, and many other areas
of mathematics and computer science. This section describes some basic definitions
and then arithmetic operations in a finite field are discussed [15].
2.4.1 Groups
A Group concept is extensively used in modern cryptography. A Group G consists of
set of elements and an operator ∗. When the operator is applied on the elements of
G, it satisfies the following properties:
• The group is closed with respect to operator ∗, i.e., ∀a, b ∈ G, a ∗ b = c ∈ G.
• Associative law : a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c,∀(a, b, c) ∈ G.
• Identity law : a ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ a = a,∀a ∈ G.
• Inverse law : a ∗ a−1 = a−1 ∗ a = 1,∀a ∈ G.
• Commutative law : a ∗ b = b ∗ a,∀a ∈ G
2.4.2 Rings
A ring R is an algebraic structure, in which elements can be added and multiplied
while satisfying the following properties:
• Commutativity : ∀a, b ∈ R, a + b = b + a ∈ R
• Associativity : ∀a, b, c ∈ R, (a+b)+c = a+(b+c) ∈ R ; (a×b)×c = a×(b×c) ∈ R
• Distributivity : ∀a, b, c ∈ R, a× (b + c) = (a× b) + (a× c)
• Additive identity : An element 0 in R such that a + 0 = a ∀a ∈ R.
• Multiplicative identity : An element 1 in R such that a× 1 = a ∀a ∈ R.
• Additive inverse : An element a1 in R such that a + a1 = 0 ∀a ∈ R.
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Examples of rings are integer numbers, the rational numbers, the complex numbers
and the real numbers. A number in a ring is said to have a multiplicative inverse if
there is a unique element b ∈ R such that a× b = b× a = 1. Then the element b is a
multiplicative inverse of a.
2.4.3 Finite Fields
A field is a commutative ring that has multiplicative inverse for all non-zero elements.
A field is a set equipped with arithmetic operations such as addition, subtraction,
multiplication and division, while satisfying commutative, associative and distributive
properties.
A finite field also called a Galois field is a field which has a finite number of ele-
ments. The number of elements in the field is called the order of the field. The order
of a finite field is always the power of a prime p i.e. q = pm, where m is any positive
integer and q is the order of field. The prime p is called the characteristic of a field.
If the order q of the field is equal to prime p then the field is called a prime field. A
more formal definition of finite field and its properties are given below.
A finite field consists of a set F together with two operations i.e, addition (denoted
by +) and multiplication (denoted by ×), such that it satisfies the following arithmetic
properties:
1. ∀a, b ∈ F , a + b ∈ F and a× b ∈ F
2. ∀a, b ∈ F , a + b = b + a and a× b = b× a
3. ∀a, b, c ∈ F , a× (b + c) = (a× b) + (a× c)
4. ∀a, b, c ∈ F , (a + b) + c = a + (b + c) and (a× b)× c = a× (b× c)
5. ∃0, 1 ∈ F , (a + 0) = (0 + a) = a, (a × 1) = (1× a) = a. Then, 0, 1 are additive
and multiplicative identities of the group respectively.
6. ∀a ∈ F,∃(−a) ∈ F such that (a +−a) = (−a + a) = 0
7. ∀a ∈ F,∃a−1 ∈ F such that a × a−1 = a−1 × a = 1. Then, a−1 is called a multi-
plicative inverse of a.
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As an algebraic structure every field is a commutative ring with an additional prop-
erty of a multiplicative inverse for non zero elements, however, every ring may not be
a field. The smallest set of finite fields are defined on characteristics 2 and 3 and are
denoted as F2 (GF(2)) and F3 (GF(3)). In this work, finite fields defined over a large
prime characteristic p are used and described as GF(p) or Fp. The number of elements
in a finite field is called its order.
This research work is focused on elliptic curve cryptography over prime fields.
In this case Fp or GF(p) consists of all integers {0,1, 2, ....., p − 1}, where arithmetic
operations are performed on integers modulo p.
2.4.4 Prime Field Arithmetic
This section describes the arithmetic operations over prime field Fp. There are differ-
ent strategies to compute these operations efficiently [16], [15]. Efficient techniques
to compute finite field arithmetic operations are described in Chapter 3. However, a
general description of these operations is described here as follows:
• Fp Addition: Given a, b ∈ Fp, compute (a + b) and (a + b − p). Output =
(a + b− p) if (a + b) ¾ p, else output= (a + b).
• Fp Subtraction: Given a, b ∈ Fp, compute (a − b) and a − b + p. Output =
(a− b + p) if (a− b) < 0, else output= (a− b).
• Fp Multiplication: Given a, b ∈ Fp, compute z=(a× b) mod p, where z is the
remainder of dividing (a× b) by p.
• Fp Inversion: For a given non zero element a ∈ Fp, a multiplicative inverse
exists, if and only if a and p are relatively prime i.e, gcd(a, p) = 1, then compute
z = a−1 mod p, where z is a unique integer in Fp such that (a× z) mod p = 1
• Fp Squaring: For a given a ∈ Fp, compute z=(a2 mod p), which is Fp multipli-
cation of an operand to itself.
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2.5 Introduction to Elliptic Curves
This work considers an elliptic curve E, defined over prime field GF(p), where p is
a large prime characteristic number, then E is defined as a set of points (x , y), with
elements in GF(p) and the curve equation in short Weierstrass form [15,16] is repre-
sented as
E : y2 = x3 + ax + b (2.1)
Where, a, b, x , and y ∈ GF(p) and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (modulo p). The set of all points
(x , y) that satisfy (2.1), plus the point at ∞ (infinity) make an abelian group. The
number of points on the curve is called the order of the curve. EC point addition and
EC point doubling operations over such groups are used to construct many elliptic
curve crypto-systems.
2.5.1 Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication
The main operation in all EC cryptographic schemes is the multiplication of a point on
an elliptic curve with a scalar ( an integer). It is also known as point multiplication
and is given as
Q = dP (2.2)
Where d is a scalar value, P, Q are points on a same elliptic curve. The operation
dP = P + P + P + .....+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
d times
can be achieved by d − 1 repeated point additions. All ECC based protocols need to
compute this dP, hence it is the central operation in all ECC schemes. It is a one
way function where a forward computation i.e, dP is easy, but to calculate d from the
given Q and P is computationally hard. It is called the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP). Thus, mathematically, the security of elliptic curve cryptosystems
depends on the hardness of ECDLP which is defined as
For a given elliptic curve E defined over Fp, a point P ∈ E(Fp) of order r, and a second
point Q ∈ E(Fp), ECDLP is to determine the integer d ∈ [0, r − 1] such that Q = dP
ECDLP is the heart of elliptic curve cryptography. The security of any cryptosys-
tem defined over elliptic curves depends on the hardness of the ECDLP problem. It is
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Figure 2.3: EC group operations
believed to be stronger and harder than the other problems such as the integer fac-
torization problem, which is the foundation of RSA cryptosystems. As a consequence,
it is expected that the key sizes of a cryptosystem defined over ECC, using a suitable
chosen elliptic curve and underlying field for a given security level are significantly
smaller than those cryptosystem defined over RSA as demonstrated in Tables 2.1 and
2.2.
Given a large d, it is not feasible to compute dP through repeated EC point addition
(PA) operation. Therefore, another special group operation of adding a point to itself
is defined and called EC point doubling (PD). There are many EC scalar multiplication
algorithms discussed in [16] [15], EC PA and PD are the two main basic operations in
all of these algorithms.
2.5.2 Elliptic Curve Group Operations
EC scalar multiplication is computed by a series of EC PD and PA operations. The EC
PA operation is an addition of two distinct EC points P with coordinates (x1, y1) and
Q with coordinates (x2, y2).
The geometrical interpretation of the EC PA operation on EC is shown in Figure
2.3(a), where a line is drawn passing through the two given points P and Q. The line
intersects the curve at a third point R′. The point R′ when reflected along the x-axis
results in a point R, which is the resultant point of the EC PA operation. Let (x3, y3) be
18
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the coordinates of R, then the mathematical interpretation of Figure 2.3(a) is given as
x3 = λ
2
PA− x1 − x2 (2.3)
y3 = λPA(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.4)
λPA =
(y2 − y1)
(x2 − x1) (2.5)
Similarly, in the EC PD operation, a tangent line to the curve is drawn at the given
point P. The tangent line intersects the curve at point R′. The reflection of point R′
along the x-axis is the resultant point of the EC PD operation, i.e., R = 2P, as shown
in Figure 2.3(b). A mathematical translation of this procedure is given as follows:
x3 = λ
2
PD − 2x1 (2.6)
y3 = λPD(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.7)
λPD =
(3x21 + a)
2y1
(2.8)
Note that, the only difference in the computation of EC PD and PA operations
are their respective λ values as given in equations (2.5) and (2.8) . It is also worth
mentioning that EC points with two coordinates (x , y) is called affine coordinates
representation.
2.5.3 Order of an Elliptic Curve
All the points in Fp that satisfy the equation (2.1) plus the point at infinity∞ forms
the elliptic curve group and is denoted as E(Fp). Each group is comprised of a finite
number of elements. The total number of points on the curve, including the point∞,
is called the order of the curve. The order of the curve is usually denoted as #E(Fp).
The upper and lower bounds of the order of the curve can be approximated by Hasse’s
theorem described as follows:
Let #E(Fp) be the number of points in E(Fp), then, it is
p + 1− 2pp ≤ #E(Fp)≤ p + 1+ 2pp
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Table 2.3: Implementation Hierarchy of ECC Based Crypto Schemes
Leyers Operations
4 EC curve crypto schemes (key exchange, digital signature, etc)
3 EC scalar multiplication
2 EC group operations (PA, PD)
1 Finite Field arithmetic primitives
GF(p) addition, subtraction, multiplication, inversion/division
The interval [p+1−2pp ≤ #E(Fp)≤ p+1+2pp] is known as the Hasse interval
[17, 18] . Since 2pp is very small relative to p, therefore #E(Fp) ≈ p. However, the
Schoof algorithm [19] is an efficient way to find the exact number of points on an
elliptic curve. Similarly, the order of a point is described as follows.
For any point P on elliptic curve E over Fp, there is a small positive integer r such
that rP =∞, then r is called the order of point P. The order of any point always exists
and divides the order of the curve #E(Fp).
2.5.4 EC Crypto Schemes Implementation Hierarchy
Typical implementation hierarchy of EC based cryptographic schemes is shown in Ta-
ble 2.3. It is divided into four layers. Top layer consists of ECC based cryptographic
protocols such as key exchange [20], EC digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [21],
secure shell (SSH) [22], transport layer security (TLS) [23], Bitcoin [24], etc. An
interested reader is referred to [25]. The next layer is the EC scalar multiplication
operation which is comprised of two EC group operations: EC PD and PA operations.
Further down, these EC group operations consist of finite field arithmetic operations
including modular addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. These finite field
primitives are the fundamental arithmetic operations, therefore they have a strong im-
pact on the overall crypto-system performance. The next section describes a simple
key exchange protocol based on ECC to illustrate the operations in elliptic curve cryp-
tography.
2.5.5 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Diffie-Hellman key exchange method provides an ability to transfer keys securely over
an insecure channel without compromising security of the encryption process. In a
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Common Parameters 
G, g, p
Alice, A BOB, B
A = gx mod p B = gy mod p
A1 = Bx mod p B1 = Ay mod p
A1= B1 = gxy 
Figure 2.4: Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme
finite field, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange methods involves several steps show in
Figure 2.4 and described as follows.
• First Alice and Bob has to agree on common parameters (G, g, p), where G is
group with generator g and a prime p.
• Alice computes A = g x mod p, for a random chosen x ∈ [1, p − 1] and sends A
to Bob.
• Bob computes B = g y mod p, for a random chosen y ∈ [1, p − 1] and sends B
to Alice.
• Alice computes A1 = Bx mod p.
• Bob computes B1 = Ay mod p.
Since A1 and B1 are equal i.e., g x y mod p, Alice and Bob successfully shared a secret
which they can use as an encryption key in the further subsequent communication. An
eavesdropper only have A, B, g, p, to find x while knowing g and g x mod p he has to
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Common Parameters 
( P, r, h, a, b, p )
Alice, A BOB, B
A = d*P B = e*P
A1 = d*B B1 = e*A
A1= B1 = edP 
EC scalar multiplication
Figure 2.5: EC based Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme
solve the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), which is not feasible to solve for enough
large values of p in a polynomial time.
An elliptic curve version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method is known as
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange. It is shown in Figure 2.5 and the
steps involved in the ECDH is given as follows.
• First Alice and Bob has to agree on common parameters (P, r, h, a, b, p), where
point P is a group generator of order r, h is a cofactor, a and b are elliptic curve
constants and p is a large prime.
• Alice computes A= dP, for a randomly chosen d ∈ [1, r−1] and sends A to Bob.
• Bob computes B = eP, for a randomly chosen e ∈ [1, r−1] and sends B to Alice.
• Alice computes A1 = dB.
• Bob computes B1 = eA.
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Since A1 and B1 are the same i.e., dB = d(eP) = dA= e(dP), both parties agreed on
the common secret using the ECDH method. Note that the operations dP, eP, dB, eA are
commonly known as an EC scalar multiplication or EC point multiplication. Therefore,
it is the fundamental operation in all the protocols based on ECC.
EC version of the DH key exchange protocol is further extended and standardized
in [26, 27]. An interested reader is referred to [25] for ECC protocols, deployment,
and security.
2.5.6 Standard Projective Coordinates
EC points represented in affine coordinates (x , y) require a modular inversion opera-
tion to compute both EC PD and EC PA operations, see equations 2.5 and 2.8. It is the
most expensive operation in terms of computation time and resource requirements.
In order to speed up the EC group operations, one common optimization is to repre-
sent points on an EC in such a way so that inversion free EC PD and PA operations
can be computed. Different projective coordinate systems have been explored. These
projective coordinate systems have the advantage of eliminating modular inversion
from the group operations at the cost of increased number of modular multiplication
operations. Typically at the end, one or two inversions are required to re-map from
projective to affine coordinates. An overall implementation flow of the EC scalar mul-
tiplication operation in projective coordinates is shown in Figure 2.6.
One such coordinate system is called standard projective coordinates. In the stan-
dard projective space setting, a point is represented using three coordinates (X , Y, Z).
An affine point P(x , y) corresponds to the point P(X Z−1, Y Z−1, Z), where Z 6= 0 in
the standard projective coordinates.
Conversions from affine-to-projective and projective-to-affine spaces are required,
however these occur only once during the scalar multiplication operation. An input
Affine-Projective EC Scalar Muliplication
d
Projective-Affine
P(x , y) P(X , Y, Z) Q(X , Y, Z) Q(x , y)
Figure 2.6: EC scalar multiplication in projective coordinates
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point for EC scalar multiplication operation is in affine coordinates (x , y) and its pro-
jective representation is (X Z−1, Y Z−1, Z), therefore affine-to-projective conversion is
required which is achieved by setting Z = 1 to avoid the conversion cost. Hence,
affine-to-projective transformation becomes a trivial process given as
(x , y) 7−→ (X , Y, 1) (2.9)
More precisely, given point in affine space (x , y), its standard projective space rep-
resentation is derived by setting the Z coordinate equal to one, then the other X , Y
coordinates are given as
(x , y) 7−→ (X , Y, 1), X = x , Y = y, Z = 1
At the end of the EC scalar multiplication operation, the projective-to-affine conversion
is required which is achieved as follows:
x = X Z−1, y = Y Z−1 (2.10)
This conversion costs two multiplications and a single inversion.
2.5.7 Jacobian Projective Coordinates
The other commonly used coordinates system is Jacobian projective coordinates, where
an affine point P(x , y) is represented as P(X Z−2, X Z−3, Z). Similarly, affine-to-Jacobian
transformation is trivial by setting the Z coordinate equal to one.
(x , y) 7−→ (X , Y, 1) (2.11)
At the end of scalar multiplication, conversion back to affine space is done as
x = X Z−2, y = Y Z−3 (2.12)
The cost of this conversion is four multiplications and one inversion. A more detailed
analysis of EC point operations in standard projective coordinates is presented in Chap-
ter 5 with complete EC scalar multiplier architectures. Further details of the Jacobian
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projective coordinates can be found in [28], [29], [16].
2.6 Side Channel Attacks
Algebraic attacks are not the only solution to deduce sensitive information of the cryp-
tosystem. There are many methods to retrieve sensitive information from the physical
implementation of a cryptographic device by monitoring some side channel informa-
tion which are called side channel attacks (SCA) [30].
Theoretically, the security of elliptic curve cryptographic systems relies on the hard-
ness of the ECDLP problem. However, ECDLP can be bypassed by exploiting several
algorithmic and implementation weaknesses. For example, if somehow an adversary
gets access to a cryptographic device, then the adversary may be able to reveal the
secret by observing timing and power consumption information. Timing and simple
power analysis (SPA) are the most common and simple side-channel attacks [31].
There are even more sophisticated attacks based on fault injection or differential
power analysis [32]. Fan et al. in [33, 34] surveyed most of the side-channel attacks
and their countermeasures.
Power analysis side channel attacks are grouped into simple power analysis (SPA)
and differential power analysis (DPA) [32]. SPA monitors a single instance of power
consumption of a device and tries to deduce the secret information. On the other
hand DPA gathers power data of several instances of the device and then statistically
analyses the data to reveal the secret information.
To employ any side channel attack, an attacker needs a physical access to a cryp-
tographic device; therefore countermeasures against these attacks are very important
in cryptosystems implemented on smart cards. However, this work targets the FPGA
as an implementation platform therefore it only considers algorithmic level counter-
measures against timing and simple power analysis attacks.
2.7 Related Work
This section reviews the literature of available hardware accelerators for point mul-
tiplication on elliptic curves. It outlines some of the proposed designs to establish a
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basic understanding of the state-of-the art research in this domain.
2.7.1 Hardware Architectures for EC Scalar Multiplication
As implementation of point multiplication on elliptic curves can be decomposed into
several layers, therefore, the overall performance and efficiency could be significantly
improved by optimization at different layers, independently. The fundamental or base
layer of an EC cryptosystem implementation is the finite field arithmetic operations.
There are different design approaches to optimize these field operations which is dis-
cussed in chapter 3. Optimized field operations can boost the overall performance of
EC point multiplication which is based on EC PA and PD operations which are in turn
based on these field operations.
Crypto-systems based on ECC are designed using either elliptic curves defined over
the binary extension field GF(2m) or curves defined over a prime field GF(p). The
nature of operations in these fields are quite different from each other. In a binary
extension field, elements are described using polynomials and reduction is done using
an irreducible polynomial. On the other hand, elements in a prime field are inte-
gers and arithmetic operations are done using integer operations modulo a prime p.
Therefore, binary field arithmetic imposes completely different design challenges as
compared to that in prime field [35]. Typically, field operations over GF(2m) are very
much hardware friendly due to carry free arithmetic. Therefore, design challenges,
implementation cost, and performance of ECC processors over binary and prime fields
are not comparable, their comparison is misleading and even not possible because of
their different underlying field representations. However, due to recent advancements
in methods for attacking discrete logarithms, there are some concerns regarding binary
curves security. Modern cryptographers tend to avoid binary curves and would like
to use prime curves for long-term security. Performance comparison of ECC hardware
implementation using binary and prime fields is presented in [36].
This work focuses on point multiplication on elliptic curves over prime field, there-
fore, the main point of discussion throughout this work is hardware implementations
and analysis of ECC over prime field. For references, some of the ECC processor de-
signs over GF(2m) are reported in [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. Review of high speed
ECC processors over GF(2m) is reported in [44], [45].
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Table 2.4: NIST Recomended Primes
|p| size Numerical value AES equivalent security level
p192 2
192 − 264 − 1 96
p224 2
224 − 296 + 1 112
p256 2
256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1 128
p384 2
384 − 2128 + 296 + 232 − 1 192
p521 2
521 − 1 256
Several prime field hardware accelerators for elliptic curve scalar multiplication
have been proposed during the last fifteen years. These designs can be classified into
two categories: designs over standard and designs over general prime fields.
2.7.1.1 EC Scalar Multipliers over Standard Prime Fields
Modular multiplication is the most time critical component in the construction of ellip-
tic curve point multiplication in projective coordinates. One of the optimization tech-
niques is by choosing a prime modulus p of special structure (very close to a power
of 2) called pseudo-Mersenne primes, which can reduce the computational complex-
ity of the reduction stage in a modular multiplication operation. In this regard NIST
recommends five prime fields [16] for different levels of security given in Table 2.4.
The prime P224 supports a security level of AES-112 bits and P256 supports a se-
curity level upto AES-128 bits which is more than enough in current scenario. Mod-
ular multiplication based on each one of the NIST recommended primes is usually
fast. However, as the prime modulus is of a special form which results in a fast
and rigid dedicated hardware architecture. This dedicated hardware is not flexi-
ble to work for any other prime values except for that which it is designed for. A
straight forward implementation of any NIST recommended prime is also not scal-
able, which means a design for P224 is not able to work for the P192. Designs reported
in [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51] are based on NIST recommended elliptic curves
over prime fields. Virtex-4 implementation of [46] completes a 256-bit EC scalar mul-
tiplication in 6.1 ms at 43 MHz clock frequency, occupies 20.1K slices and 32 DSPs
blocks (16 × 16 embedded multipliers). Alrimeih et al. in [47] extended the same
design to increase performance and side channel attacks resistivity. Its implementa-
tion on Virtex-6 computes a 192-bit EC scalar multiplication in 0.3 ms and 3.91 ms for
512-bit multiplication. It occupies 33K LUTs, 289 DSPs blocks (18× 18 multipliers),
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and 128 RAMB36 (36K random access memory). In [48], two high speed ECC proces-
sors are proposed: one design is for NIST prime p224 while the other is for the NIST
prime p256. The designs are implemented on Virtex-4 FPGA and utilized embedded
16 × 16-bit multipliers in DSP blocks and built-in RAM. A similar design optimized
for NIST prime p256 is reported in [52]. Moreover, it is worth noticing that designs
in [48], [52] are only optimized for a single NIST recommended prime, whereas [47]
is the only available design that supports all NIST primes.
The designs in [50], [49] are efficient residue number system (RNS) implementa-
tions of elliptic curve point multiplication over prime field. The designs are structured
on a new finite field multipliers, which is designed using Montgomery and RNS tech-
niques. Arithmetic in RNS domain enables carry free computation and hence results
in lower computation time. However, arithmetic using RNS domain requires binary-
to-residual and residual-to-bianry transformations besides the original operation. The
designs exploited NIST primes special structure (not flexible). Moreover, [50] is very
vulnerable to timing and simple power analysis attacks while [49] provides resistivity
to the mentioned attacks. Bernstein et al. in [53] presents that there are many con-
cerns regarding NIST chosen primes and ECs, therefore it is worth to target general
prime field for ECC applications to provide the user more flexibility and security.
2.7.1.2 EC Scalar Multipliers over General Prime Field
Several general prime field ECC processors are also available in the literature. These
designs can be classified according to their adopted coordinates systems and reduc-
tion techniques. Another optimization technique is to use different number systems to
compute a modular multiplication operation as fast as possible for example, the Mont-
gomery number system [54] and the Residue number systems (RNS) [16]. These are
useful where the conversion cost before and after an operation does not dominate the
overall cost of the operation.
Designs reported in [51, 55, 56, 57] are built using EC points representation in
affine coordinates. Ghosh et al. in [56], proposed an elliptic curve scalar multiplier
architecture over general prime field resilient to timing and power analysis attacks.
The design performed point addition and doubling operations using affine coordi-
nates (x , y), which also requires modular inversion/division operations in addition
to the field addition, subtraction, and multiplication. Its arithmetic unit consisted of
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two modular addition, two modular subtraction, two modular multiplication, and two
modular division units. The Virtex-4 FPGA implementation of the design computes a
256-bit EC scalar multiplication in 7.7 ms, cycle count of 330K, runs at a maximum
clock frequency of 43 MHz, and occupies 20.1K slices. The design is also resilient
against timing and SPA attacks.
[55] proposed a compact programmable arithmetic unit (PAU) to perform finite
field arithmetic operations. Then, EC scalar multiplier architecture is presented based
on dual instances of the PAU. EC points are represented in affine coordinates, and
Montgomery powering ladder method [58,59] for EC scalar multiplication is adopted
to perform point doubling and addition operations in parallel. Its implementation
on Virtex-II pro completes a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication in 9.38 ms, achieves a
maximum frequency of 36 MHz, cycle count of 338K, and consumes 12K slices. The
design also provides protection against timing, SPA, and DPA attacks.
The designs reported in [60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72] are based on
projective coordinates and most of the designs have adopted the Montgomery modu-
lar multiplication technique to perform the modular multiplication operation. A very
recent survey on hardware analysis of ECC processors on binary and prime fields are
reported in [73].
Moreover, there are many elliptic curve representations offering different trade-offs
between computational performance and security [16]. Constructions of new elliptic
curves is also an active area of research; their structures, parameters and security is
discussed in [74]. Another active research domain is to formulate new coordinate
systems with fewer field multiplications to compute EC group operations [28], [29].
Furthermore, the underlying platform also plays an important role in the perfor-
mance of point multiplication on elliptic curves. The same design implemented on a
CMOS customized library would be faster than the corresponding FPGA implementa-
tion. However, the FPGA is reconfigurable which means that an existing design can
be replaced with a new one on the same FPGA. The other important factor to choose
an FPGA as the underlying implementation platform is its lower design cost. In this
thesis FPGA is used for implementing EC scalar multiplication and therefore a brief
introduction to FPGAs is provided below.
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2.8 FPGA Architecture
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are semiconductor devices that offer in-
house programmability to users. The design concept of FPGA is directly opposite to
the application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), which are built for particular ap-
plications. FPGA based design is more flexible as compared to ASIC design. However
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Figure 2.7: A Generic FPGA Architecture [75]
ASIC design yields higher performance and lower power consumption. Therefore, for
applications where flexibility and cost are more important than performance (speed),
FPGA as an implementation platform is more suitable than ASIC.
A generic FPGA architecture is shown in Figure 2.7. It is a programmable matrix
of configurable logic blocks (CLBs). These CLBs can be connected to one another by
available horizontal and vertical wires, which behave as programmable interconnects.
Input/output (I/O) ports of different capacity and speed are located around the edges
to handle I/O signals. Through CLBs, FPGAs can be programmed for different desired
functionalities or applications. The reconfigurability of FPGA makes it the most suit-
able implementation platform for security algorithms, which may need to be updated
from time-to-time to avoid many security breaches.
CLB is the fundamental component of a FPGA to implement combinational and
sequential circuits. Its internal architecture varies for different vendors and families.
Xilinx [76] and Altera [77] are the two well known FPGA vendors that enjoy large
market shares. Virtex-6 is considered as a suitable family of Xilinx FPGA devices to
achieve high level of performance and functionality of any design. It is selected as the
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Table 2.5: Virtex-6 FPGA CLB Internal Resources [78]
Slices LUTs Flip-Flop Carry Chains DRAM Shift Registers
2 8 16 2 256 bits 128 bits
targeting device to evaluate the performance of the EC scalar multipliers in this work.
Virtex-6 FPGA [79] is build on a high performance logic fabric of a 40nm CMOS
technology. Each CLB in a Virtex-6 FPGA consists of two slices organized in column
with dedicated carry chain. Each slice consists of the following elements
• Four function generators or look-up-tables (LUTs).
• Eight storage elements.
• Wide-function multiplexers.
Table 2.5 demonstrates logic resources in one Virtex-6 FPGA CLB. Each of the func-
tion generators are implemented as six input look-up-table (LUTs). These LUTs can be
used to implement any arbitrary six-input boolean functions. In addition to these con-
figurable blocks, modern FPGAs are also equipped with dedicated blocks to perform
arithmetic operations. For example, in Virtex-6, DSP48E1 slices are also available to
perform signal processing specific tasks. These DSP blocks can be configured to per-
formed a variety of other arithmetic functions. Each DSP48E1 slice is comprised of a
25×18-bit multiplier, an accumulator and an adder. On the other hand Virtex-4 FPGA
DSP48E slice consists of a 16×16-bit multiplier and an accumulator. These available
small multipliers can be utilized to build large integer multipliers to perform large
operand multiplications.
However, a design utilizing these in-built multipliers may not be portable to other
FPGA families because of different internal architecture of DSP slices. It may also be
less flexible as compared to a design that is build using CLBs only. Therefore, DSP
blocks are not used in this research work to add more flexibility and portability in the
presented designs.
In this work all the designs are coded in Verilog HDL. Xilinx ISE 14.1 Design Suite
is used for synthesis, mapping, placement and routing purposes while Xilinx ISE sim-
ulator (ISim) is used for behavioral simulation and initial design verification.
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Figure 2.8: Design steps of FPGA implementation
2.8.1 FPGA Implementation Design Flow
Figure 2.8 shows the steps usually followed to implement any design on an FPGA
platform. Initially to design any system, a specification is required called design spec-
ification. The design specifications are generally presented as a document describing
a set of functionalities that the final solution will have to provide and a set of con-
straint that it must satisfy. In this context, the system level architecture is the initial
process of deriving a potential and realizable solution from the design specifications
and requirements.
This work first implements a system level architecture of the proposed modular
multipliers and EC scalar multipliers in software using C# as an implementation lan-
guage.
After system level design verification, potential hardware architectures are mod-
elled and designed at Register Transfer Level (RTL) using a Hardware Description
Language (Verilog HDL). Then, RTL design verification consists of acquiring a reason-
able confidence that a circuit will function correctly, under the assumption that no
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manufacturing fault is present. To validate functionality, the RTL design is run and
tested on Xilinx ISIM and Modelsim simulators. This step is called the behavioral sim-
ulation. After simulation, the proposed architectures are synthesized using Xilinx ISE
Design Suite 14.1 targeting Virtex-6 FPGA to check whether designs are suitable for
the selected device or not. The report generated by the synthesis tool (ISE Design
Suite 14.1) summarizes the initial design implementation results on a selected FPGA
device. The report shows area consumption (LUTs, slices, registers), maximum clock
frequency (critical path delay), etc. All design and logic errors of the proposed archi-
tectures are removed in the synthesis phase. Post place and Route is done for routing
hardware thus optimizing hardware (gates), power and latency. After successful vali-
dation, the RTL design is ready for implementation on the FPGA.
It is not easy to provide fair performance comparisons of a design implemented on
different platforms. However, the analysis presented in [80] shows that an FPGA im-
plementation is approximately 35 times larger and between 3.4 to 4.6 times slower on
average compared to an ASIC implementation. In [81] a performance comparison of
different cryptographic algorithms implemented on different platforms (FPGA, ASIC,
General Purpose Processor) has been presented. The performance comparison shows
that ASIC and FPGA implementations are always faster than the software implemen-
tations. It is reported that FPGA implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is two
times faster than its software implementation.
Implementation results are sensitive to the chosen platform. Comparing ASIC and
FPGA, an FPGA LUT has higher delay as compared to an ASIC gate. Also when mea-
sured in kilo-gates per square micrometre, ASIC gate density is very high as compared
to an FPGA [82]. Results also depend on the synthesis tool used for ASIC and FPGA
implementations. FPGA and ASIC tools might support different synthesis directives
and options related to a design optimization.
Different FPGA families have different slice architectures. For example, Xilinx
Virtex-6 has four LUTs and eight registers. Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA slice has two LUTs
and two registers. Due to this reason, slice logic utilization for the same design will
be different for different FPGA families. Also since each family of FPGAs has unique
architecture, it will also greatly affect the measured performance [83].
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2.9 Conclusion
This chapter introduces the background and mathematical tools that are of prime im-
portance in the design of elliptic curve scalar multiplier. Basic concepts of different
cryptographic schemes with their recommended key sizes are introduced first. Then,
finite fields and elliptic curve arithmetic over prime field are presented. Next, different
implementation strategies of EC scalar multiplication at different levels of its imple-
mentation hierarchy are discussed. Finally, FPGA structure is briefly introduced. The
discussion of hardware acceleration of finite field arithmetic operations is presented
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Hardware Architectures for Finite Field
Arithmetic
Crypto-systems based on public-key cryptography (PKC) [1], [2], [3], [8] are struc-
tured using finite field arithmetic primitives such as modular addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and inversion [45]. Among these primitives, modular multiplication
and inversion/division are the most computational intensive operations. In fact mod-
ular inversion/division are the most tedious and expensive operations as compared
to modular multiplication operation. Therefore, alternative ways have been investi-
gated and designed to perform inversion/division free EC group operations. These
methods are known as projective coordinates as described in Chapter 2. Therefore
using projective coordinates is the most critical field operation is a modular multipli-
cation [16], [15].
This chapter first describes algorithms and design strategies to perform modular
addition, modular subtraction, and modular inversion/division operations. Then, it
presents two novel modular multiplier architectures based on radix-4, radix-8, Booth
encoding and interleaved multiplication techniques. Radix-4, radix-8 and Booth en-
coding techniques are used to optimize the interleaved modular multiplication algo-
rithm. The optimized radix-4 and radix-8 versions of interleaved modular multipli-
cation algorithms result in 50% and 66% reduction in total number of clock cycles
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required to perform a modular multiplication operation. The proposed multipliers do
not require any operand and result conversion as required in Montgomery method
discussed in the next section. Performance of the presented multiplier architectures is
discussed and analysed for different field sizes.
3.1 Background and Related Work
Finite filed arithmetic operations are the fundamental components to construct any
EC crypto-systems. Among these components field multiplication, field inversion and
field division are more critical than field addition and subtraction due to their inher-
ent computational difficulties. In fact, field inversion/division operations are more
expensive in terms of computation time and resource requirements as compared to
field multiplication both on hardware and software platforms. Projective coordinates
systems enable inversion/division free EC group operations. Thus, the most critical
operation in EC group operation in projective coordinates is finite field multiplication.
Several techniques have been proposed to speed-up finite field multiplication opera-
tion discussed as follows.
The classical method to perform a finite field multiplication of operands a and b
over a prime modulus p is defined in equations (3.1) and (3.2).
R = a× b (3.1)
c = R mod p (3.2)
It is a two-step process: integer multiplication and reduction modulo p. The reduction
modulo p step typically requires a trail division operation which is a very computa-
tional intensive operation, therefore many strategies have been proposed to lower
the computational intensity of the reduction step. Generally these strategies can be
divided into in three main categories [35,84]: designs over standard primes [85], de-
signs based on Montgomery multiplication method [54] and designs over interleaved
multiplication method [86,87].
In order to lower the computational intensity of the reduction step NIST recom-
mended five specialized primes p of size (p192, p224, p256, p384, p512) as given in Table
2.4. These primes have a special structure that are very close to a power of 2 i.e.,
36
3.1. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2a±2b±2c ±2d ±1, and are called pseudo-Mersenne primes. Modular multiplication
operation over this type of prime can result in higher performance and lower com-
putational cost. However, a design optimized for a particular modulus value results
in a very dedicated architecture, which can not be used for any other prime values,
hence the architecture lacks flexibility. A pipelined modular multiplier design reported
in [88] can support five NIST recommended primes. Its datapath is comprised of 8
pipeline stages with a latency of 80ns for primes of size 192, 224, 256-bits and 200 ns
for 384, 256-bits. It consumes 8340 slices and 259 dedicated DSPs blocks on Virtex-6
FPGA platform, which may not fit into smaller FPGAs, but is suitable for high speed
applications. Designs reported in [48], [52] also exploited special structure of NIST
primes, p224 and p256. These implementations are devoted to p224,p256 and are not
able to provide the flexibility to accommodate other primes, which is one of the main
focuses of this thesis.
Montgomery multiplication method converts the required division operation into
cheaper shift and addition operations. However, to make use of the Montgomery
method operands must be transformed from normal to Montgomery representation
to perform operation in the Montgomery domain, and the result must be transformed
back to the normal domain to yield the final result of a modular multiplication op-
eration. The method is suitable where the conversion overhead is negligible as com-
pared to the main operation cost, for example in exponentiation algorithms. Mont-
gomery multiplication based designs are reported in [89] and [90], in which [90] is
based on radix-4 and [89] incorporates radix-216 techniques. The designs reported
in [57], [60], [63], [69], [71] are based on radix-2 implementation. In [91] several
possible implementation strategies of Montgomery multiplication are discussed on the
basis of performance and implementation cost. Amnor et al in [92] report that radix-2
implementation of interleaved modular multiplication has better area-delay product.
Other interesting hardware implementations of Montgomery modular multiplica-
tion are [89], [93], [94] and [95]. Among these [93] presents interleaved modular
multiplier based on Montgomery and Barrett reduction techniques, [94] presents time
and area efficient modular multiplier. The design in [95] is based on redundant radix-
216 while [89] is based on radix-256.
The designs reported in [96], [97] used built-in FPGA Digital signal Processing
(DSP) blocks to design 256-bit modular multiplier architecture based on Montgomery
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method.
Interleaved multiplication method was proposed by Blakley [86,87] in 1983. The
method is based on iterative addition and reduction of partial products. Partial prod-
ucts accumulation and intermediate results reduction are integrated in a way to elim-
inate the final division. The idea is to reduce intermediate results below the modulus
value in each iteration so that the final division can be avoided. The algorithm starts
traversing a multiplier from most-significant-bit (MSB) to least-significant-bit (LSB).
Several modifications and hardware architectures have been reported [55], [56], [92],
[93], [98], [99], [100], [101], [102]. In [93] a faster interleaved modular multiplier
based on Montgomery and Barrett reduction techniques is reported. Its 130-nm ASIC
implementation runs at a maximum frequency of 320 MHz and computes one 256-bit
modular multiplication in 0.05 us.
Ghosh et al. in [100] reports a radix-2 parallel interleaved modular multiplier. Its
Virtex-II Pro FPGA implementation consumes 3475 slices with a latency of 3.2 us and
takes n clock cycles to perform an n-bit modular multiplication. The same multiplier
is utilized in [99] in construction of a dual core pairing processor. A robust GF(p)
parallel arithmetic unit for public key cryptography is reported in [103]. The parallel
arithmetic unit can perform modular addition, subtraction, multiplication and inver-
sion/division operations. The arithmetic unit adopted interleaved modular multipli-
cation to perform modular multiplication and extended Euclidean algorithm (EEA) to
perform inversion/division operations.
Similarly in [55] a compact programmable arithmetic unit is based on the same
algorithms (Interleave multiplication and EEA ). The required number of adders is
reduced by exploiting hardware sharing techniques, however the unit is not able to
execute field operations in parallel and is not suitable for high performance applica-
tions. The design in [104] is based on pre-computation, carry save addition and sign
estimation techniques. However, it requires carry propagation adder at the final stage.
Montgomery and interleaved multiplication methods are widely used in the de-
sign of finite field multiplier. Performance comparison of these methods are discussed
and analysed in [105]. The proposed higher radix modular multipliers in this thesis
is based on interleaved multiplication method, works directly on numbers in two’s
complement formats and thus do not require any conversion. Performance of these
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Algorithm 1: Modular addition
Input: a =
∑n−1
i=0 ai · 2i, b =
∑n−1
i=0 bi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: a + b mod p
1 S← a + b;
2 if S ≥ p then
3 S← S − p;
4 end
5 return S;
modular multipliers is evaluated against bit level implementation of interleaved mul-
tiplication method.
The rest of this chapter explains the adopting techniques in this work to perform
finite field arithmetic primitives.
3.2 Modular Addition/Subtraction
Modular addition (a + b) mod p and modular subtraction (a − b) mod p primitives
involve two n-bit adders cascaded in series [35], [84]. In addition to these adders,
multiplexing logic is also required at different levels to control the datapath. The
critical component is the adder logic due to long carry propagation delay. FPGA in-
built fast carry chains (FCC) can be used to speed up the addition operation. This
work uses high speed adder based on FCC and carry select approach [99]. Modular
addition operation is described in algorithm 1 while modular subtraction is described
in algorithm 2.
3.2.1 Modular Addition
Hardware realization of modular addition (a + b) mod p of two operands a and b is
shown in Figure 3.1. The first n-bit adder performs addition of two input operands
i.e., S1 = a + b. Then, the prime p is subtracted from the result S1 by taking two’s
complement of p i.e., S2 = S1 + (∼ p) + 1 in the second n-bit adder. These partial
results are multiplexed and assigned to the final result S. During the modular addition
operation the input signal cin is set to zero.
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Figure 3.1: Modular addition architecture
Algorithm 2: Modular subtraction
Input: a =
∑n−1
i=0 ai · 2i, b =
∑n−1
i=0 bi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: a− b mod p
1 S← a− b;
2 if S < 0 then
3 S← S + p;
4 end
5 return S;
3.2.2 Modular Subtraction
The architecture in Figure 3.2 performs modular subtraction (a − b) mod p of two
operands a and b, when the input signal cin is set to one i.e., (cin = 1). The first adder
logic performs subtraction (a − b) as (S1 = a + (∼ b) + 1), where (∼ b + 1) is the
two’s complement of b (because cin = 1). Then, the result is added with a prime p by
the second adder and the final result is selected by the carry out signal of first adder
which is indication of an underflow.
Modular addition/subtraction operations can be performed by a same architecture
as shown in Figure 3.3. The select signal (sel) determine the operation to be performed
by the architecture. For example if sel is equal to zero then it outputs s = (a+ b) mod
p otherwise it performs s = (a− b) mod p operation. This architecture takes a single
clock cycle to produce the results of modular addition or subtraction operation.
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Figure 3.2: Modular subtraction architecture
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Figure 3.3: Modular addition/subtraction architecture
3.3 Modular Inversion/Division
Modular inversion of a mod p exists if and only if a and p are relatively prime, i.e.
when the greatest common divisor of a and p is equal to one i.e. gcd(a, p) = 1. Then
the modular inversion of a is given in equation (3.3)
b = a−1 mod p (3.3)
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[?]In ECC, usually modular inversion is performed by two methods: Fermat’s little
theorem and extended Euclidean algorithm [16]. Fermat’s little theorem dictates that
ap−1 mod p = 1 and therefore dividing both sides by a turns into ap−2 mod p = a−1.
By adopting this method an inverse can be calculated by modular exponentiation
which requires a large number of modular multiplication operations. Modular di-
vision using this method is usually performed by a modular inversion followed by one
modular multiplication operation.
Another method to calculate modular inverse is by knowing the greatest common
divisor of two integers expressed as a linear combination of two. Since a and p are
relatively prime then the following expression may be solved for integers b and t:
ab + pt = 1 mod p
This linear equation implies that:
ab ≡ 1 mod p
Thus, b is the inverse of a mod p and the values of b and t are derived by an algorithm
known as the extended Euclidean algortihm (EEA). Kaliski in [106] proposes a variant
of EEA which is able to perform Montgomery inverse. This algorithm is useful when
the operands are represented in the Montgomery domain.
The binary version of EEA [16] is widely used due to its simpler shift (division by
2) and subtraction operations and is given in algorithm 3. The algorithm is imple-
mented to compute modular inversion/division operations following the guidelines
and architectural flow reported in [107], [103]. The algorithm consists of one outer
and two inner loops. In the inner loops similar operations are performed on different
intermediate signals. At start variables u, v, a1 and a2 are loaded with an operand a,
a modulus p, one and zero respectively. It is worth mentioning that to compute a
modular division (c/a mod p), the variable a1 must be loaded with c instead of one.
The algorithm can be divided into three smaller parts which are given as follow.
1. First inner loop (FIL)
2. Second Inner loop (SIL)
3. Outer loop (OL)
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Algorithm 3: Modular Inversion/Division
Input: a =
∑n−1
i=0 ai · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: b = a−1 mod p
1 u← a, v← p, a1← 1, a2← 0
2 while (u 6= 1 and v 6= 1) do
3 while (u is even ) do
// First inner loop //
4 u← u/2
5 if a1 is even then a1← a1/2 else a1← (a1 + p)/2
6 end
7 while (v is even ) do
// Second inner loop //
8 v← v/2
9 if a2 is even then a2← a2/2 else a2← (a2 + p)/2
10 end
// Outer loop //
11 if u≥ v then u← u− v, a1← a1 − a2 mod p
12 else v← v − u, a2← a2 − a1 mod p
13 end
// Final step //
14 if u = 1 then
15 b← a1
16 end
17 else
18 b← a2
19 end
These three loops are shown in Figure 3.4, where outputs v, a2, u and a1 are new
values at each iteration of the algorithm. FIL step is comprised of steps 4 and 5, SIL is
comprised of steps 8 and 9, and OL consists of steps 11 and 12.
Internal architectures of FIL and SIL are shown in Figure 3.5. The architectures
perform exactly identical operations on their respective inputs concurrently. Even or
odd signal is determined by the least significant bit indexed with [0]. The value is
even if the least significant bit is zero and odd otherwise.
An internal architecture of the OL unit is shown in Figure 3.6. It is comprised of
two magnitude (-) and two modular subtractors (-) mod p. The condition u ≥ v is
checked by borrow out signal of v−u operation. The total number of iterations in the
algorithm is 2n where n is bit length of modulus p therefore the presented architecture
computes n-bit modular inversion/division operations in 2n clock cycles. For example,
inversion/division in a 256-bit field size are performed in 512 clock cycles.
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3.3.1 Implementation Results
The cost of division and inversion using the binary version of EEA is the same, which
is exactly 2n clock cycles. The implementation of modular inversion/division using
the EEA technique on the Virtex-6 FPGA platform is given in Table 3.1.
For a 256-bit field size implementation, it takes 3.52 us, consumes 5363 LUTs and
achieves 149 MHz maximum clock frequency. A drawback of the EEA technique is its
implementation cost as compared to Fermat’s little theorem. Inversion using Fermat’s
little theorem can be accomplished using modular multiplication therefore there is no
u a1v a2p
(-) mod p
0 1
u
0 1
a1
a1a2 p
01
a2
u a1 a2
01
v
v
(-) mod p
Figure 3.6: OL internal architecture
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Table 3.1: Modular inversion/division implementation on Virtex-6
Field size (bits) Area (LUTs) Freq (MHz) clock cycles Time (us)
192-bits 3931 173 384 2.2
224-bits 4550 159 448 2.83
256-bits 5363 149 512 3.52
need for dedicated hardware for inversion. However, EEA is mostly adopted where
performance is more critical than implementation cost. The main focus of this work
is on the performance (speed) so EEA is used.
3.4 Modular Multiplication
An interesting algorithm to perform modular multiplication with interleaved reduction
is reported in [86], [87] and is known as Interleaved modular multiplication (IM)
method. Two main advantages of the IM method are: Unlike the Montgomery method
it does not require any operands and result conversions between conventional and
Montgomery domain and still it is able to eliminate the final division step. It reduces
the intermediate results below the modulus in each iteration to eliminate the final
division step. The complete method is given in algorithm 4.
It is based on an iterative addition of partial products (x · yi) to an accumulator
z. In each iteration the contents of accumulator z are single-bit left-shifted and re-
duced modulo p i.e., (2z mod p). In the same iteration the partial product (x · yi) is
conditionally added to the accumulator z depending on the i th bit of a multiplier y as
explained in the algorithm.
The procedure adopted in algorithm 4 is known as double and add algorithm ev-
ident from steps 4 and 6. It starts from the most significant bit (MSB) of multiplier
yn−1 and conditionally adds multiplicand x to the accumulator z depending on yi. At
each iteration intermediate results and partial products are reduced by a modulus p
to keep them in the range (0, p− 1). The main operations are
1. One bit left-shift of z modulo p, this operation is denoted as modular doubling
mentioned in step 4.
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Algorithm 4: Basic Serial radix-2 Interleaved Multiplication (R2IM)
Input: x =
∑n−1
i=o x i · 2i, y =
∑n−1
i=o yi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=o pi · 2i
Output: z = x × y mod p
1 z← 0;
2 for i from n− 1 downto 0 ; // n is a bit-length of p
3 do
4 z← 2z mod p ; // modular doubling
5 if yi = 1 then
6 z← (z + x) mod p ; // modular addition
7 end
8 end
9 return z
S2 = S1 + (~p) + 1 COUTCIN
z
p
01
(2z) mod p
1
CIN
2z
S1
Figure 3.7: Modular doubling architecture
2. Modular addition of multiplicand x to z as described in step 6.
These two steps constitute the overall data path of the radix-2 implementation of the
IM algorithm (R2IM). In an integer multiplication, doubling (2z) is simply accom-
plished by one bit left-shift operation which is merely a rewiring in hardware (free of
cost), but in case of modular multiplication a reduction by a modulus p is also needed,
therefore it is either shift (2z) or shift-and-reduce (2z − p) operations i.e., a modulus
p is subtracted from the result of 2z if it is greater than or equal to p. Thus in a finite
field its hardware realization consists of one n-bit adder and one 2 : 1 multiplexer as
shown in Figure 3.7. The modular addition step can be realized in hardware by two
n-bit adders and one 2 : 1 multiplexer as shown in Figure 3.1.
Let tadd denote the critical path delay of an n-bit adder and tmux denote the critical
path delay of a 2 : 1 multiplexer. Then the critical path delay of R2IM multiplier
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architecture (TR2I M) is given in equation 3.4.
TR2I M = 3tadd + 2tmux (3.4)
It is evident from the equation that hardware realization of the R2IM algorithm has
a critical path delay of three n-bit adders and two 2 : 1 multiplexers. The total num-
ber of iterations in the R2IM algorithm is n, if each of the iterations is executed in a
single clock cycle then the total number of clock cycles required to execute the R2IM
algorithm is exactly n, where n represents the bit length of modulus p.
3.5 Radix-4 BE Interleaved Multiplication
Several modifications have been proposed to optimize the IM method. Ghosh et al.
in [100] proposed an architecture that exploited Montgomery powering ladder tech-
nique [59] to execute modular doubling and modular addition operations in parallel
(R2PIM). However, internal operations are performed bit wise so it also takes n clock
cycles to execute an n-bit modular multiplication operation. Two other novel mod-
ifications of IM algorithm and their optimized hardware architectures are presented
in [98].
There are three basic building blocks of any multiplier design, they are.
• Partial products generation
• Partial products reduction
• Partial products accumulation
There are n partial products in the R2IM and R2PIM multipliers, thus without any
partial products reduction techniques their generation and accumulation take n clock
cycles, therefore these modular multiplier designs takes n clock cycles to perform an
n-bit modular multiplication operation for n-bit operands.
There are several techniques to reduce the total number of partial products and one
such technique is known as Booth encoding (BE) [108], [109], [110], [111]. Com-
bining BE with higher radix methods can reduce the total number of partial products,
which ultimately reduces the total number of iterations in the R2IM algorithm.
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Table 3.2: Radix-4 Booth encoding
Yi Yi−1 Yi−2 Encoded value
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 +1
0 1 0 +1
0 1 1 +2
1 0 0 −2
1 0 1 −1
1 1 0 −1
1 1 1 0
xxxxxx 0
0, ± 1,  ±2 
0, ± 1,  ±2 
0, ± 1,  ±2 
xx
0, ± 1,  ±2 
Figure 3.8: Radix-4 Booth encoding
In a simple radix-4 method two bits of a multiplier are processed at a time either
moving from MSB towards LSB or vice versa. The two-bit pair can possibly be 002,
012, 102, and 112, in integer form these are {0,1, 2,3}. Therefore, using radix-4 the
possible partial products can be 0, x , 2x mod p, and 3x mod p.
By combining radix-4 and BE techniques, the possible partial products can be 0,
x , −x , 2x mod p, and −2x mod p. BE technique shown in Figure 3.8 works on
groups of three bits with an overlapping bit from the previous group and encodes
these groups into one of the possible values in Table 3.2 i.e., {0,±1,±2}. BE is a
sign digit representation where each group or block is encoded as a signed number in
two’s complement format. Sign extension of the multiplier y is also required in the case
where there are less than 3 bits in the left most group. As in ECC, the multiplication
operation is computed over positive numbers. So adding zeros to the left of the MSB
of a multiplier is enough to complete the left most group. As the effective number of
bits processed in each iteration in Radix-4 BE is two, the number of zeros to be added
to the left of the MSB of an n-bit multiplier y is determined as follows:
• If n modulo 2 = 0, then append two zeros to the left of the MSB of multiplier y
• if n modulo 2 = 1, then append a single zero to the left of the MSB of multiplier
y
As the recommended ECC key sizes are all of even number of bits, so two zeros are
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Algorithm 5: Radix-4 BE Interleaved Multiplication (R4BIM)
Input: x =
∑n−1
i=0 x i · 2i, y =
∑n−1
i=0 yi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: (z = x × y) mod p
1 z← 0
2 R← 2x mod p // Pre-computed value //
3 N ← n+ 2 // append two 0s to left of MSB of y //
4 N ← N + 1 // append a single 0 to right of LSB of y //
5 for (i = N ; i ≥ 2; i = i − 2) do
6 z← 4z mod p
7 switch (y(i:i−2)) do
8 when {000 | 111}=⇒ z← z
9 when {001 | 010 | 101 | 110}=⇒ z← z ± x mod p
10 else =⇒ z← z ± R mod p
11 endsw
12 end
13 return z
inserted to the left of the MSB of a multiplier. One extra zero needs to be added to the
right of the LSB of multiplier y , as the overlapping bit for the first block. Therefore,
an extra iteration is required due to the adding of two zeros to the left of the MSB of
multiplier y .
Modification to the R2IM algorithm based on radix-4 and BE techniques (R4BIM)
is given in algorithm 5. The proposed R4BIM algorithm reduces the total number
of iterations from n to bn/2c+ 1, therefore the number of partial products is halved,
which results in a considerable amount of reduction in multiplication time and the
required number of clock cycles. Algorithm 5 also involves two major operations
given as follows:
• Two-bit left shift mod p operation i.e., 4z mod p as specified in step 6.
• Modular addition or subtraction (add/sub) operation as specified in steps 9 and
10.
Due to processing two bits of multiplier y at a time excluding the overlapping bit the
R4BIM algorithm becomes double-double add or subtract algorithm. In each iteration
step 6 and either of step 8, step 9 or step 10 are executed. The steps 6 and either of
step 9 or 10 constitute an overall data path of the R4BIM algorithm.
In every iteration of the algorithm, the accumulator z is two-bit left shifted and
then reduced modulo p i.e., 4z mod p. Then, partial products b1(0,±x ,±2x) are
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modular added or subtracted from the accumulator z depending on the three respec-
tive multiplier bits. Modular addition of z and b1 (z + b1 mod p) is required in the
case of partial products b1 = {x , 2x}, while if partial products b1 = {−x ,−2x}, then
modular subtraction operation is needed i.e., (z − b1) mod p. The two bit left shift
mod p operation is performed as two single bit left shift mod p operations which is
described in the next section. It is worth mentioning that step 2 of the algorithm is
performed by a pre-computation process.
3.5.1 Hardware Architecture
Hardware architecture to execute the R4BIM algorithm is shown in Figure 3.9. The
architecture can be divided into macro and micro blocks. Two modular doubling (2z
mod p) and a single modular Add/Sub blocks are the macro blocks while the BE and
M are considered as a micro blocks. In addition to these blocks the architecture also
contains one shift register SR, two n-bit registers z, R and a control unit which is
not shown in Figure 3.9. The modular doubling blocks are identical, each of them
is responsible for performing a 2z mod p operation. The internal architecture of the
modular doubling block is shown in Figure 3.7, where it is discussed that hardware
realization of 2z mod p operation requires one n-bit adder and one 2:1 multiplexer.
The second modular doubling block in Figure 3.9 performs a single bit left shift mod
p operation on the output of the first modular doubling block and produces the result
of the 4z mod p operation. As this operation is executed as two sequential 2z mod p
operations, so in total it is carried out by two n-bit adders and two multiplexers. Note
that left-shift operation () does not cost anything in hardware because it is achieved
by just rewiring.
The macro Add/Sub mod p block performs modular addition or subtraction op-
eration depending on its input carry in signal (cin). Its internal architecture has also
been discussed in section 3.2 (see Figure (3.3) ). Its critical path delay is comprised of
two n-bit adders and three 2:1 multiplexers. Partial products b1 can have five possi-
ble values i.e., {0,±1,±2}x . In the implementation these are divided into two parts:
b1 = {0,+1,+2}x and b1 = {−1,−2}x . These two parts are distinguished by the out-
put of block BE (cin), which indicates the Add/Sub block either to perform a modular
addition or subtraction operation. The block BE is based on radix-4 Booth encoding
logic, where yi, yi−1 represent the two current bits and yi−2 represents the overlapping
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Figure 3.9: R4BIM multiplier architecture
bit of the previous block of a 3 bits block of multiplier y . The overall execution flow
of algorithm 5 on the architecture in Figure 3.9 is described below.
• In the first clock cycle register z is loaded with multiplicand x , registers SR, z are
loaded with the multiplier y and 0 receptively. In the next clock cycle, partial
product 2x mod p is pre-computed in the first modular doubling block, which is
then stored in register R. Thus, the pre-computation of 2x mod p is completed
in two clock cycles.
• Then, the register z is two-bit left shifted and are reduced modulo p in the two
modular doubling blocks. Partial products (0,±x ,±2x) are then modular added
or subtracted from the accumulator z in the Add/Sub block. Modular addition
or subtraction is controlled by the BE block. All these operations are performed
in a single clock cycle.
• The SR register left shifts two bits of the multiplier y in each iteration.
• Note that the micro blocks M , BE, and SR perform their respective operations in
parallel with the macro blocks.
The total number of iterations of the algorithm is exactly bn/2c+1. The given hardware
architecture executes each iteration in a single clock cycle, therefore it takes bn/2c+3
clock cycles to perform an n-bit modular multiplication operation. Note that an extra
two clock cycles are consumed for the pre-computation of the 2x mod p operation. It
is also worth mentioning that step 5 of the R4BIM algorithm is controlled by a counter
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Figure 3.10: Radix-8 Booth encoding
which is decremented twice after each iteration. This counter logic is a part of the
control unit, which is not shown in Figure 3.9.
The critical path delay of the R4BIM is comprised of the two modular doubling
and a single modular add/sub blocks which is given in equation 3.5.
TR4BIM = 4tadd + 5tmux (3.5)
3.6 Radix-8 BE Interleaved Multiplication
The R4BIM algorithm reduces the number of loop iterations from n to bn/2c+ 1. The
iteration count can be further reduced by adopting radix-8 instead of radix-4 method.
The modified IM algorithm based on radix-8 and BE techniques (R8BIM) is given in
algorithm 6. The radix-8 BE technique is given in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.10, where
each quadruple of multiplier y is encoded as {0,±1,±2,±3,±4}with a one bit overlap
from the previous group. Sign extension of multiplier is also required in the case
where there is less than four bits in the left most group. As in ECC positive numbers
are handled so adding zeros to the left of the MSB of multiplier y , it is enough to
complete the left most group. As the effective number of bits processed in radix-8 BE
is three, therefore the number of zeros to be added to the left of the MSB of an n-bit
multiplier y is determined as follows.
• If n modulo 3 = 0, add three zeros.
• If n modulo 3 = 1, add two zeros.
• If n modulo 3 = 2, add a single zero.
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Algorithm 6: Radix-8 BE Interleaved Multiplication (R8BIM)
Input: x =
∑n−1
i=0 x i · 2i, y =
∑n−1
i=0 yi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: z = x × y mod p
1 z← 0, R1← 2x mod p, R2← 3x mod p, R3← 4x mod p,
N =

n+ 3, if n mod 3 = 0 append three 0 to the left of MSB of y
n+ 2, if n mod 3 = 1 append two 0 to the left of MSB of y
n+ 1, if n mod 3 = 2 append single 0 to the left of MSB of y
2 N ← N + 1, append single 0 to the right of LSB of y
3 for (i = N; i ≥ 3; i = i − 3) do
4 z := 8z mod p
5 switch (y(i:i−3)) do
6 when {0000 | 1111}=⇒ z← z
7 when {0001 | 0010 | 1101 | 1110}=⇒ z← z ± x mod p
8 when {0011 | 0100 | 1011 | 1100}=⇒ z← z ± R1 mod p
9 when {0101 | 0110 | 1001 | 1010}=⇒ z← z ± R2 mod p
10 else =⇒ z← z ± R3 mod p
11 endsw
12 end
13 return z
Finally, one extra zero needs to be added to the left of the LSB of a multiplier y acting as
the overlapping bit for the first block. The generation of ±3,±4 is the major difference
to the R4BIM algorithm.
The R8BIM algorithm takes bn/3c+ 1 iterations to perform an n-bit modular mul-
tiplication operation. It is comprised of several steps which are explained as follows.
• In step 1, 2x mod p, 3x mod p and 4x mod p values are computed only once.
This is done by a pre-computation process which is explained in the next section.
• Step 4 is performed iteratively throughout the loop iterations. It is a three-bit
left shift modulo p value of an accumulator z i.e., 8z mod p.
• In steps 7-10, respective partial products are modular added or subtracted from
the accumulator z i.e., z = z ± { x , R1, R2, R3}. Selection of the respective par-
tial product is based on the current four bits of multiplier y being processed
according to Table 3.3.
Therefore in each iteration of the algorithm first the accumulator z is three bits left
shifted and reduced modulo p. Then in the same iteration the respective partial prod-
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Table 3.3: Radix-8 Booth encoding
yi yi−1 yi−2 yi−3 Encoded value
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 +1
0 0 1 0 +1
0 0 1 1 +2
0 1 0 0 +2
0 1 0 1 +3
0 1 1 0 +3
0 1 1 1 +4
1 0 0 0 −4
1 0 0 1 −3
1 0 1 0 −3
1 0 1 1 −2
1 1 0 0 −2
1 1 0 1 −1
1 1 1 0 −1
1 1 1 1 0
uct is modular added or subtracted from the accumulator. The total number of partial
products using radix-8 and BE techniques is reduced from n to bn/3c+ 1.
3.6.1 Hardware Architecure
A hardware architecture to execute the R8BIM algorithm is shown in Figure 3.11. The
R8BIM architecture is composed of four major blocks: three modular doubling and one
modular Add/Sub. These four major blocks are cascaded in series which means that
each block output is the input to the next block. In addition to these major blocks, the
R8BIM architecture also contains a look-up-table based multiplexer M , a BE block, a
three-bit shift register SR, and four n-bit data registers R1, R2, R3 and z. Execution of
the R8BIM algorithm on the presented architecture can be divided into two phases: A
and B. These are detailed as follows:
3.6.1.1 Phase A
As in the step 1 of the R8BIM method a pre-computation of 2x mod p, 3x mod p
and 4x mod p is needed for a multiplicand x . The pre-computation of these required
values is completed in Phase A and is explained below.
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Figure 3.11: R8BIM multiplier architecture
• In the first clock cycle register z is loaded with the multiplicand x . In the next
clock cycle, the first and second modular doubling units output 2x mod p, 4x
mod p values receptively. In the same clock cycle these values are stored in
registers R1, R3 respectively.
• In the next clock cycle 3x mod p value is computed in Add/Sub block by setting
its inputs to x , 2x mod p, and cin to zero. Note that zero is set for the output of
block BE which indicates add/sub block to execute a modular addition operation
on its respective inputs. Then the result of Add/Sub block is stored in register
R2 in the next clock cycle.
After four clock cycles registers R1−3 are loaded with their respective values and the
pre-computation process is completed.
3.6.1.2 Phase B
In phase B, the following steps of the algorithm are performed on their respective
hardware units in iterative fashion, which are explained as below.
• Loop iteration is controlled by a counter which is decremented by three after
each iteration.
• Step 4, 8z mod p is performed by three identical modular doubling units cas-
caded in series. The operation is divided into three single bit left shift mod p
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operations executed in a serial fashion given in equation 3.6.
8z mod p = 2(2(2z mod p) mod p)) mod p (3.6)
Register z is initially loaded with zero in phase A. In each iteration of phase B the
accumulator is three bits left shifted and reduced modulo p. Then a respective
partial product is modular added to or subtracted from the accumulator.
• Steps 5-11 are executed by the M block and Add/Sub block. Block M is a look-
up-table based multiplexer that selects the appropriate partial products to be
modular added or to subtracted from the accumulator in the Add/Sub block.
• The BE block accepts four consecutive multiplier bits and generates a single bit
control signal (cin) that controls the Add/Sub block to perform either modular
addition or subtraction operation. If it is equal to zero then modular addition is
performed otherwise subtraction is executed.
The controller is based on a counter. It controls the loop execution and also generates
appropriate signals to execute phase A and B. Each iteration of the loop is executed
in a single clock cycle. As the total number of iterations in BE radix-8 IM algorithm
is exactly bn/3c+ 1. Therefore, the proposed architecture performs an n-bit modular
multiplication operation in bn/3c+5, in which the extra four clock cycles are consumed
in the pre-computation process (phase A) of the algorithm.
The critical path delay of BE radix-8 IM is comprised of three modular doubling
and one modular add/sub blocks which is given in equation (3.7).
TR8BIM = 5tadd + 6tmux (3.7)
By comparing equations (3.5) and (3.7), it is evident that in the critical path of R8BIM
multiplier, one extra n-bit adder and one 2:1 multiplexer is required as compared to
R4BIM multiplier (see equation (3.5)), however it reduces the number of clock cycles
from (bn/2c+3) to (bn/3c+5), which is almost 33% lower than the required number
of clock cycles of the R4BIM multiplier . A performance analysis on the basis of com-
putation time, area requirements, operating frequencies and throughput is discussed
in the next section.
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Table 3.4: Area comparison of IM multipliers implementation on Virtex-6
Design Field size (p) Slices Look-up-tables (LUTs) Slice registers
R2IM 160-bits 631 1733 531
192-bits 757 2049 627
224-bits 993 2401 723
256-bits 1012 2900 777
R4BIM 160-bits 1186 2911 556
192-bits 1272 3511 652
224-bits 1447 4053 748
256-bits 1550 4606 845
R8BIM 160-bits 1320 3234 562
192-bits 1442 4119 659
224-bits 1547 4549 755
256-bits 1710 5149 851
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Figure 3.12: Area comparisons of IM multipliers
3.7 Implementation and Results
The R4BIM and R8BIM multipliers are coded in Verilog HDL and are synthesized tar-
geting Virtex-6 FPGA. The Xilinx ISE 14.1 design suite is used for synthesis, mapping,
placement, and routing. For behavioral simulation, ModelSim and Xilinx Isim sim-
ulators are used. The proposed modular multipliers are also implemented in C# to
validate the design functionality.
These architectures have inherent programmability features i.e., the modulus value
p can be changed without reconfiguring the FPGA. Table 3.4 lists the area consumption
on Virtex-6 platform for 160, 192, 224 and 256-bit field sizes.
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A 256-bit implementation of the R4BIM multiplier occupies 1550 Virtex-6 slices
(4606 LUTs, 845 slice registers), whereas the R8BIM multiplier on the same platform
for the same field size occupies 1710 slices (5149 LUTs, 851 slice registers). Note that
these indicate that the R8BIM multiplier consumes 9.4% more FPGA slices than the
R4BIM multiplier.
Implementation results for the R2IM technique have been reported in [55], [56],
[94], [104]. However, for these implementations different FPGA platforms have been
used, thus, a direct comparison with the proposed designs is not very effective. For a
fair comparison, this work also implemented R2IM algorithm on Virtex-6 FPGA plat-
form as well. Its implementation results are also given in Table 3.4. For a 256-bit
implementation, it occupies 1012 slices (2900 LUTs, 777 slice registers). Its slice
consumption is almost 35%, 41% lower than the corresponding R4BIM and R8BIM
multipliers, respectively. It is evident from Table 3.4 and Figure 3.12 that the pre-
sented higher-radix IM designs consume more FPGA slices, LUTs and slice registers as
compared to bit level implementation (radix-2). However, higher-radix designs result
in reduced multiplication time as discussed below.
A comparison on the basis of multiplication time, throughput (TP) and area×time
per bit (ATB) value is demonstrated in Table 3.5. ATB values in the table is calculated
on the basis of equation (3.8).
AT B =
no. of occupied slices × total time
no. of bits
(3.8)
For a 224-bit implementation the R4BIM architecture computes one modular multipli-
cation operation in 1.29µs at a maximum clock frequency of 89.1 MHz. For a 256-bit
implementation it takes 1.48µs at a maximum clock frequency of 88.5 MHz. Similarly,
a 224-bit R8BIM architecture takes 1.08µs to compute one modular multiplication op-
eration at a maximum frequency of 73.2 MHz, which is almost 17% faster than the
R4BIM design.
A 224-bit implementation of the R2IM multiplier takes 1.74 µs to compute a modu-
lar multiplication operation and achieves 129 MHz maximum frequency. The proposed
R4BIM and R8BIM multiplier are 35% and 61% faster than the corresponding R2IM
multiplier. Figure 3.13 depicts computation time of the presented designs against dif-
ferent field sizes.
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Table 3.5: Performance of IM multipliers on Virtex-6 for different field sizes
Design Field size (p) Freq (MHz) Time (µs) TP (Mbps) ATB
R2IM 160-bits 136.8 1.18 135.5 4.65
192-bits 131.6 1.46 131.5 5.77
224-bits 129 1.74 128.7 7.71
256-bits 125 2.03 126 8.02
R4BIM 160-bits 94 0.88 181 6.52
192-bits 91.6 1.08 178 7.15
224-bits 89.1 1.29 173.6 8.33
256-bits 88.5 1.48 172.9 8.96
R8BIM 160-bits 77.1 0.752 213 6.2
192-bits 75.7 0.91 211 6.8
224-bits 73.2 1.08 206 7.5
256-bits 72 1.25 205 8.35
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Figure 3.13: Computation time of different IM multipliers
For a 256-bit implementation, the R4BIM and R8BIM multipliers have throughput
of 172.9 and 205 Mbps (Mega bits per second), which is 37% and 63% higher than
the throughput of R2IM multiplier (126 Mbps) respectively.
The number of clock cycles required to perform a multiplication may be considered
as a platform independent parameter. The R4BIM and R8BIM architectures reduce the
required number of clock cycles to perform one multiplication by almost 50% and 66%
respectively. However, inside the presented designs the main operations are executed
in serial fashion which results in the longer critical path delays. Thus, despite the
lower clock cycle count the ATB values are higher than the R2IM multiplier as evident
from the last column of Table 3.5. Therefore, the presented R4BIM and R8BIM designs
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are suitable for high performance applications at the cost of more logic resources.
3.8 Conclusion
Basic finite field arithmetic operations are the building blocks in the design of elliptic
curve scalar multiplier architecture. In this regard, this chapter first presents algo-
rithms and corresponding architectures for modular addition/subtraction, inversion/-
division operations. Then, two modular multiplier designs based on radix-4, radix-8,
Booth encoding, and interleaved multiplication techniques are presented. The archi-
tectures and implementation results are compared and discussed.
The presented R4BIM and R8BIM multipliers provide 27% and 39% improvement
in a computation time over a corresponding bit level radix-2 IM multiplier. However,
internal critical operations of the presented designs are performed in serial fashion
which limits their performance. In the next chapter these designs are optimized in
terms of critical path delay.
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Chapter 4
High Performance Parallel Modular
Multipliers
Typical higher-radix based multipliers produce faster results because of their lower
iteration count as compared to a bit-level radix-2 implementation. However, these
techniques deteriorate the critical path delays, which limit the maximum achievable
clock frequencies and speed performance. To obtain maximum performance several
optimization techniques can be explored to reduce the critical path delay in higher-
radix multiplier designs. Parallelization is an optimization technique that reduces the
computation time by reducing the critical path delay.
This Chapter shows that there is a good scope of parallelism in the designs of radix-
4, radix-8 Booth encoded interleaved multipliers presented in Chapter 3. This chapter
first investigates independent operations in the designs and then presents parallel high
performance hardware architectures that facilitate the parallel execution of these in-
dependent operations. Then, the chapter also presents a comprehensive performance
analysis of different parallel and serial higher-radix interleaved multiplier designs.
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4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3, modular multiplication is the fundamental and computa-
tionally intensive operation in many Public-Key cryptographic processors. Hence, it
has a substantial impact on the overall performance of the associated cryptosystems.
Therefore, its optimization is one of the common strategies to boost the overall per-
formance of the cryptosystem.
Performance of a modular multiplier can be assessed using some quantitative met-
rics. These performance measuring metrics include computation time, resource re-
quirements, power consumption, throughput, etc. As the objective of this research is
to reduce the overall computation time for scalar multiplication on elliptic curves, em-
phasis is on increasing the performance of modular multiplier in terms of computation
time and throughput, while keeping an eye on the resource requirements.
As discussed in chapter 3, modular multiplication over a prime field is either per-
formed by iterative interleaved additions and reduction or absolute reduction follow-
ing an integer multiplication. The absolute reduction step involves division by a large
prime p which is another costly operation. Therefore, this work focuses on the tech-
nique based on repeated interleaved addition and reduction modulo p. Another well
known method for modular multiplication is Montgomery method [54]. This method
requires operand conversion from normal binary form to Montgomery domain and
the result conversion from Montgomery domain back to normal binary form, which
needs extra computations besides the actual modular multiplication operation. The
method adopted here works directly on numbers in two’s complement form and does
not need any operands and result conversions. Higher-radix IM methods presented
in chapter 3 exhibit longer critical path delays as compared to the radix-2 or bit level
implementation of the IM method as indicated in equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.7).
Critical path of a R2IM multiplier is comprised of three n-bit adders and two mul-
tiplexers, whereas the critical path of a R4BIM multiplier consists of four n-bit adders
and five multiplexers, and in the case of R8BIM it is five n-bit adders and six multiplex-
ers. The longer critical paths decrease maximum achievable frequencies. Therefore,
optimization techniques to shorten the critical path is of utmost importance in higher-
radix based IM multiplier designs. An IM multiplier design with an optimized critical
path is reported in [103], in which the critical path is reduced to two n-bit adders and
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two 2:1 multiplexers as given in equation (4.1).
TR2PI M = 2tadd + 2tmux (4.1)
Where TR2PI M denotes the critical path delay of the radix-2 parallel interleaved multi-
plier (R2PIM). This bit-level parallel design also requires n clock cycles to perform an
n-bit modular multiplication operation.
This chapter presents parallel modular multipliers with their efficient architectures
based on higher-radix and BE techniques. The parallelism idea is adapted from the
Montgomery powering ladder approach. Due to the introduced parallelism, the de-
signs are able to execute the main operations concurrently. Higher-radix can reduce
the required number of clock cycles for a multiplication operation. In this regard
radix-4 and radix-8 discussed in chapter 3 have been adopted to reduce the itera-
tion count. It is also observed that incorporating BE logic in the radix-4 and radix-8
parallel multipliers helps to reduce the area cost with a slight degradation in the max-
imum achievable clock frequencies. Therefore, the number of required clock cycles
are reduced by using higher-radix techniques and the critical paths are reduced by
introduced parallelism to execute the critical operations concurrently.
Novel higher-radix parallel modular multiplication algorithms and the correspond-
ing hardware architectures are presented in the following sections. Performance com-
parison of these higher-radix parallel multipliers and higher-radix serial multipliers
presented in Chapter 3 are also compared in detail on the basis of computation time,
operating frequency, area consumption and throughput.
4.2 Motivation
There are two ways to speed up a modular multiplication, reducing the required num-
ber of clock cycles or decreasing the critical path delay which in turn increases the
operating frequency. These aspects of any design are interrelated in such a way that
typically it is not possible to optimize both at the same time. Optimization in terms
of reducing the number of clock cycles using higher-radix techniques deteriorates the
critical path delay as shown in the R4BIM and R8BIM multipliers in the previous chap-
ter.
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The critical operations in these designs are executed in serial fashion and hence,
these designs have long critical paths thus are not able to achieve higher frequencies.
These designs are referred as serial higher-radix IM multipliers. The main operations
in R4BIM algorithm are given below:
1 z← 0;
2 for i = N ; i ≥ 2; i = i − 2 do
3 z← 4z modulo p;
4 z← z ± pp modulo p // pp denotes partial products //
5 end
It processes a two-bit of a multiplier in each iteration, therefore the number of
iterations are reduced to half as compared to a radix-2 implementation. However the
critical path is comprised of steps 3 and 4, which consists of four n-bit adders and
five 2:1 multiplexers i.e., 4add + 5mux . Similarly, in case of the R8BIM multiplier
design the step 4 remains the same while step 3 is replaced by a three-bit left shift
modulo p operation, which is realized using 3add +3mux . Hence, the overall critical
path of the R8BIM multiplier consists of 5add+6mux . Introducing parallelism allows
the execution of steps 3 and 4 of the algorithm concurrently as explained in the next
section.
4.2.1 Montgomery Powering Ladder
Algorithm 7: The Montgomery Powering Ladder for exponentiation [59]
Input: x , y ← [yn−1, yn−2, ..., y0]
Output: x y
1 R0← 1, R1← x
2 for i = n− 1 downto 0 do
3 if (yi = 0) then
4 R1← R0 · R1; R0← (R0)2
5 end
6 else
7 R0← R0 · R1; R1← (R1)2
8 end
9 end
10 return R0
Parallelization of the main operations in higher-radix IM designs is inspired by the
Montgomery powering ladder (ML) technique which is given in algorithm 7. The ML
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Algorithm 8: Radix-4 Parallel IM Multiplication (R4PIM)
Input: x =
∑n−1
i=0 x i · 2i, y =
∑n−1
i=0 yi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: z = x × y mod p
1 z← x , R1← x
2 R2← 2x mod p, R3← 3x mod p // Pre-computed values //
3 z← 0
4 for (i = 0; i ≤ N − 2; i← i + 2) do
5 switch (y(i+1:i)) do
6 when 00 =⇒ v← 0
7 when 01 =⇒ v← R1
8 when 10 =⇒ v← R2
9 when 11 =⇒ v← R3
10 endsw
// Following operations are executed in parallel //
11 R1← 4R1 modulo p
12 R2← 4R2 modulo p
13 R3← 4R3 modulo p
14 R← z + v modulo p
15 end
16 return z
method was initially proposed to speed-up the square and multiply technique of an
exponentiation. The ML method eliminates conditional branch evaluation and enables
parallel execution of a multiplication and squaring operations as shown in steps 4 and
7 of the algorithm. Both operations are performed at every iteration of the algorithm
irrespective of the exponent bit yi.
At the end of each iteration, internal variables R0, R1 are assigned the results
of multiplication or squaring operations depending on the current exponent bit yi.
Therefore, data dependencies between these operations are completely eliminated.
4.3 Radix-4 Parallel Interleaved Multiplier (R4PIM)
Radix-4 Parallel interleaved multiplication (R4PIM) method is given in algorithm 8.
This method, instead of two-bit left shift mod p of the accumulator contents, shifts the
possible partial products in each iteration starting from LSB to MSB of a multiplier.
The algorithm is comprised of two phases: A and B. In phase A pre-computation of
possible partial products are computed which are 2x mod p and 3x mod p. Notice that
partial products 0, x are available and do not require any pre-computation. In phase
B, several operations in the algorithm are performed independently and iteratively. In
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each iteration all the partial products are two-bit left shifted and are reduced modulo
p which are shown in the steps 11, 12, 13. In step 14, the modular addition of the
accumulator and respective partial product is performed. Note that there is no data
dependency in steps 11, 12, 13 and 14. Therefore, they can be performed concurrently
on their respective hardware units. It is also worth noticing that steps 11, 12 and 13
are exactly identical i.e., 4R1−3 mod p operation whereas step 14 is a modular addition
operation. As these operations can be performed in parallel therefore, any of the steps
11, 12, 13 and 14 constitute an overall critical path of the R4PIM multiplier which is
discussed in the next section.
4.3.1 Hardware Architecture
A hardware architecture to execute algorithm 8 is shown in Figure 4.1. The architec-
ture is comprised of four processing elements (PE1−4) operating in parallel and four
n-bit data registers R1−4 and some multiplexers. The internal architectures of (PE1−3)
units consist of two modular doubling blocks cascaded in series as presented in chap-
ter 3 (Figure 3.9) while PE4 unit is a modular adder described in section 3.2. PE1 has
two outputs i.e. 2x modulo p and 4x modulo p so it is slightly different than PE2 and
PE3 which have only one 4x modulo p output.
The R4PIM algorithm also needs some pre-computed values therefore the whole
process in the algorithm is divided into two phases: phase A and phase B. Phase A deals
with the pre-computation process while phase B carries out the iterative execution of
the algorithm. The functionality of these phases and their execution on the given
architecture in Figure 4.1 are detailed below:
4.3.2 Phase A
For radix-4 technique where two bits of a multiplier are processed at a time, possible
partial products are {0, x , 2x , 3x}, where x is the multiplicand and {2x , 3x} needs to
be pre-computed before start of the multiplication process. Phase A deals with the
computation of {2x , 3x} modulo p operations. To compute these operations registers
z, R1 are loaded with a multiplicand x , then PE1 performs 2x modulo p, which is either
2x or 2x−p and are available after a single clock cycle at output u1 of the unit as shown
in Figure 4.2. Then, it is stored in register R2 by setting the respective select signal. In
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Figure 4.1: R4PIM multiplier hardware architecture
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Figure 4.2: Internal architecture of first processing element
first two clock cycles computation of 2x modulo p operation is completed and stored
in register R2. Then, 3x modulo p operation is performed as (R2 + x) mod p, which is
computed in PE4 unit in a single clock cycle by selecting appropriate operands (R2 and
x) and the result is stored in register z. In the next clock cycle, register R3 is updated
by register z, which is the required result of 3x mod p operation. Therefore, four
clock cycles are consumed in the computation of 2x and 3x mod p operations. PE4
architecture (modular adder) consist of two n-bit adders cascaded in series with some
data-multiplexing circuitry. The first adder performs operand addition s1 = (x + y),
then modulus p is subtracted from the result in the second adder i.e., s2 = (s1 − p),
and finally outputs either s1 or s2. This phase of the algorithm is completed in just four
clock cycles. After these four cycles, now registers R1, R2 and R3 hold operand x , 2x
mod p, and 3x mod p, respectively.
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4.3.3 Phase B
In phase B of the algorithm several operations are executed in parallel on the hardware
architecture as given in Table 4.1. In each iteration four operations specified as R1 =
4R1 mod p, R2 = 4R2 mod p, R3 = 4R3 mod p, and z+v mod p are executed in parallel
on PE1, PE2, PE3 and PE4 units, respectively.
In this execution phase select signals sel1−3 are set to one so that registers R1, R2
and R3 can not be updated with operands x , u1 and z, respectively. PE1, PE2, and PE3
units perform two-bit left shift mod p operations i.e., 4R1, 4R2, and 4R3 in parallel .
Internal architectures of two-bit left shift mod p is presented in chapter 3 Figure 3.9
where it is executed as two single bit left shift mod p operations and each single bit
left mod p operation consists of a single n-bit adder and a multiplexer. Therefore, the
critical paths of PE1, PE2, and PE3 are identical, and is comprised of 2add + 2mux .
Operation (z + v) of the algorithm is performed by PE4, which has a critical path of
2add+mux , as all these four operations are executed in parallel, therefore the critical
path of the radix-4 parallel modular multiplier is given in equation (4.2).
TR4PIM = 2tadd + 4tmux (4.2)
Note that in Figure 4.1 the critical path is between any of registers R1, R2, R3 and z,
where two data multiplexers (4:1 and 2:1)1 are in the path in addition to PE4 unit.
There are exactly n2 iterations. In every iteration, all steps in phase B of the algorithm
are executed in a single clock cycle, therefore, this phase is completed in n2 clock cy-
cles and overall the algorithm takes n2 + 4 clock cycles to perform an n-bit modular
multiplication operation. For example a 256-bit modular multiplication is performed
in 132 clock cycles. An overall execution of a modular multiplication operation on the
proposed R4PIM multiplier is given in Table 4.1.
14:1 multiplexer has a critical path delay of two 2:1 multiplexers
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Algorithm 9: Radix-4 BE Parallel IM Multiplication (R4BPIM)
Input: x =
∑n−1
i=0 x i · 2i, y =
∑n−1
i=0 yi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: z = x × y mod p
1 z← 0, R1← x
2 R← 2x mod p // Pre-computed value //
3 N ← n+ 2 // append two 0’s to left of MSB of y //
4 N ← N + 1 // append a single 0 to right of LSB of y //
5 for (i = 0; i ≤ N − 2; i← i + 2) do
6 switch (y(i+2:i)) do
7 when 000 | 111 =⇒ v← 0
8 when 001 | 010 | 101 | 110 =⇒ v← R1
9 else =⇒ v← R2
10 endsw
// Following operations are executed in parallel //
11 R1← 4R1 modulo p
12 R2← 4R2 modulo p
13 z← z ± v modulo p
14 end
15 return z
4.4 Radix-4 Booth Encoded Parallel Interleaved Mul-
tiplier (R4BPIM)
In the design of R4PIM multiplier four processing units (PE1−4) are operated in paral-
lel. As each of PE1−3 is comprised of two n-bit adders and two 2:1 data multiplexers.
PE4 is a modular adder and its hardware realization consists of two n-bit adders and a
single 2:1 multiplexer. Therefore, there are in total of eight n-bit adders. By adopting
BE logic one processing unit can be saved which ultimately saves two n-bit adders and
three 2:1 multiplexers as explained below.
In case of radix-4 Booth encoding, the possible partial products are 0,±x and ±2x
using two’s complement representation subtraction can be implemented using addi-
tion. Therefore, only two partial products +x ,+2x are required. Hence, one process-
ing unit is saved as compared to the R4PIM multiplier design. The processing unit
PE4 (modular addition unit) needs to be replaced with a modular addition/subtrac-
tion unit. Therefore the critical path of radix-4 booth encoded parallel IM ( R4BPIM )
multiplier is slightly longer than the R4PIM multiplier.
R4BPIM method is given in algorithm 9. Zeros need to be appended in the case
where there is not enough bits in the MSB block of a multiplier as discussed in Chapter
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3. The R4BPIM algorithm scans triplets of a multiplier y from LSB to MSB and instead
of shifting the accumulator it shifts partial products in each iteration. It is comprised
of several independent steps such as 11, 12 and 13.
In steps 11, 12 two-bit left shift modulo p operation is performed on the partial
products as discussed in the previous section while step 13 is a modular addition or
subtraction determined on the output cin signal of BE logic. The BE logic circuit
generates the cin signal on the basis of three respective multiplier bits. The R4BPIM
method given in algorithm 9 also works in two phases, phase A and phase B similar
to the R4PIM algorithm. Now in phase A only 2x mod p value is required to be pre-
computed. These phases are discussed in the following section.
4.4.1 Hardware Architecture
Hardware architectures of the R4BPIM multiplier is shown in Figure 4.3.The presented
architecture consists of three processing elements PE1, PE2 and PE3. In addition to
these main elements there is a BE block, three n-bit data registers R1, R2, z. The
internal architectures of PE1 and PE2 are exactly the same as the PE1−3 units in the
R4PIM multiplier. The PE3 unit is a modular addition/subtraction unit given in Figure
3.3. The execution process of the R4BPIM algorithm on the given architecture in
Figure 4.3 is explained below.
4.4.2 Phase A
Again the phase A deals with the computation of 2x modulo p operation. The registers
R1 is loaded with the multiplicand x , then in the next clock cycle PE1 performs 2x
modulo p which is available at output u1 of the unit. Then, in the same clock cycle it
is stored in register R2 by setting the sel2 signal equal to zero. Therefore step 2 of the
algorithm is completed in two clock cycles.
4.4.3 Phase B
In phase B of the algorithm several operations are executed in parallel on the hardware
architecture as demonstrated in Table 4.2. In each iteration three operations R1 = 4R1
mod p, R2 = 4R2 mod p and z = z ± v mod p are executed in parallel on PE1, PE2
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Figure 4.3: R4BPIM multiplier hardware architecture
and PE3 units, respectively. In this execution phase select signals sel1 and sel2 are set
to one, which indicates that registers R1 and R2 can not be updated with x and u1
respectively. PE1 and PE2 perform two-bit left shift mod p operations i.e., 4R1 mod p
and 4R2 mod p in parallel. Each of these individual operations are executed as two
single bit left shift mod p operations where each single bit left shift mod p operation
consists of a single n-bit adder and a multiplexer. Therefore, the critical paths of PE1
and PE2 are identical which is comprised of 2add + 2mux .
The operation of z = z + v or z = z − v of the algorithm is performed by PE3
unit, where its critical path consists of 2add + 3mux (see Figure 3.3), as these three
operations are executed in parallel, therefore the critical path of the R4BPIM multiplier
is given in equation (4.3).
TR4BPIM = 2tadd + 7tmux (4.3)
Note that in Figure 4.3 critical path is either between registers R1 and z or R2 and z,
where there is a single (8:1) and a single (2:1) data multiplexers 2 are in the path in
addition to PE3 unit. Their are exactly b n2c+1 iterations and in every iteration all steps
in phase B of the algorithm are executed in a single clock cycle, therefore, this phase
is completed in b n2c+1 clock cycles and overall the algorithm takes b n2c+3 clock cycles
28:1 multiplexer has a critical path delay of three 2:1 multiplexers
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Table 4.2: Operation sequence of modular multiplication on R4BPIM multiplier
#cycle PE1 PE2 PE3
1 R1 = x -
2 - R2 = 2x mod p -
3 R1 = 4R1 R2 = 4R2 z = (z ± v)
3 R1 = 4R1 R2 = 4R2 z = (z ± v)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
b n2c+ 3 - - z = final result
to perform an n-bit modular multiplication operation. The pre-computation process
does not incur any additional combinational blocks and it only costs two clock cycles
overhead.
4.5 Radix-8 Booth Encoded Parallel Interleaved Multi-
plier (R8BPIM)
The iteration count in R4BPIM multiplier can be reduced from b n2c+ 1 to b n3c+ 1 us-
ing radix-8 and BE techniques as explained in Chapter 3. A radix-8 BE parallel IM
(R8BPIM) multiplier technique is given in algorithm 10. The radix-8 BE technique
is shown in Figure 3.10, where it scans a quadruplet of a multiplier y with a single
bit overlap between adjacent quadruplets. Possible partial products in this case are
{0,±1,±2 ± 3,±4}x . Radix-8 BE technique is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, see
Section 3.6.
The R8BIM algorithm is comprised of five main steps i.e. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. The
step 17 is a modular add/sub operation. The other steps (13-16) are three-bit left-
shift modulo p operation. There is no data dependency, therefore, all these operations
can be executed in parallel. In the case of R8BPIM, the iteration count is reduced
to bn/3c+ 1, however it requires more design space due to the increased number of
processing units required to execute more operations in parallel which is discussed in
the next section.
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Algorithm 10: Radix-8 BE Parallel IM Multiplication (R8BPIM)
Input: x =
∑n−1
i=0 x i · 2i, y =
∑n−1
i=0 yi · 2i, p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi · 2i
Output: z = x × y mod p
1 z← x , R1← x
2 R2← 2x mod p, R3← 3x mod p, R4← 4x mod p // pre-computed values //
3 N =

n+ 3, if n mod 3 = 0, append three 0 to the left of MSB of y
n+ 2, if n mod 3 = 1, append two 0 to the left of MSB of y
n+ 1, if n mod 3 = 2, append single 0 to the left of MSB of y
4 N ← N + 1 // append a single 0 to right of LSB of y //
5 for (i = 0; i ≤ N − 3; i = i + 3) do
6 switch (y(i+3:i)) do
7 when 0000 | 1111 =⇒ v← 0
8 when 0001 | 0010 | 1101 | 1110 =⇒ v← R1
9 when 0011 | 0100 | 1011 | 1100 =⇒ v← R2
10 when 0101 | 0110 | 1001 | 1010 =⇒ v← R3
11 else =⇒ v← R4
12 endsw
// Following operations are executed in parallel //
13 R1← 8R1 mod p
14 R2← 8R2 mod p
15 R3← 8R3 mod p
16 R4← 8R4 mod p
17 z← z ± v mod p
18 end
19 return z
4.5.1 Hardware Architecture
The R8BPIM architecture in Figure 4.4 is comprised of four identical three-bit left shift
mod p processing units PE1−4 and the modular add/sub unit named as PE5. In addition
to these it also contains some data registers R1−4, z and a BE logic block.
Here phase A of the algorithm is completed in four clock cycles. In clock cycle
one registers R1, z are loaded with multiplicand x . Then in the next clock cycle, PE1
computes 2x mod p and 4x mod p values which are then stored in registers R2, R4,
respectively. In the third clock cycle 3x mod p value is computed in PE5 for inputs
z, R2 and the result is stored in register z. In clock cycle four this value is loaded
to register R4 and the pre-computation process is completed. Note that this is a very
similar procedure adopted in the pre-computation process of R4PIM multiplier shown
in Figure 4.1. Therefore it is also completed in four clock cycles.
In phase B, PE1−4 units performs three-bit left shift mod p operation i.e., 8x mod
p. The internal architectures of these units are identical as explained in chapter 3
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(see section 3.6.1), where it has been shown that 8x mod p operation can be com-
puted by three n-bit adders and three multiplexers cascaded in series. The BE block
as shown in Figure 4.4 now operates on four multiplier bits i.e., yi+3, yi+2, yi+1, yi and
generates a control signal cin for the PE5 unit. As the total number of iterations in the
algorithm is bn/3c+1, therefore the proposed architecture computes an n-bit modular
multiplication operation in bn/3c+ 5 clock cycles.
Operation scheduling of the R8BPIM algorithm on the architecture in Figure 4.4
is given in Table 4.3. It is observed that now the critical path is shifted to PE1−4 units
because each of these unit is comprised of three n-bit adders and three multiplexers,
therefore the critical path of the BE radix-8 IMML multiplier is given in equation (4.4).
TR8BPIM = 3tadd + 4tmux (4.4)
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4.6. PLATFORM INDEPENDENT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Table 4.4: Resource requirements analysis of IM multipliers
Design Resource requirements
R2IM [86] 3Aadd + 2Amux+ Areg
R2PIM [100] 3Aadd + 5Amux+ 2Areg
R4BIM 4Aadd + 4Amux+ 2Areg
R4PIM 8Aadd + 14Amux+ 5Areg
R4BPIM 6Aadd + 17Amux+ 4Areg
R8BIM 5Aadd + 5Amux+ Areg
R8PIM 23Aadd + 31Amux+ 9Areg
R8BPIM 14Aadd + 28Amux+ 6Areg
4.6 Platform Independent Performance Analysis
This section presents performance analysis of different IM multiplier designs. The
same design on different implementation platforms produces varying results, hence it
is not conclusive to compare designs implemented on different platforms. This sec-
tion demonstrates a platform independent analysis of the IM multiplier designs. The
designs are analysed on the basis of their space complexity (resource requirements),
critical path delay and latency.
4.6.1 Resource Requirements
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5 demonstrates resource requirements of the IM multiplier
designs, where Aadd , Amux and Areg represent the area of an n-bit adder, an n-bit mul-
tiplexer and an n-bit register respectively. The radix-2 implementation of the IM al-
gorithm (R2IM) requires 3Aadd + 2Amux and a single n-bit register. Similarly, R2PIM
design reported in [100] has an area complexity of 3Aadd + 5Amux and two n-bit regis-
ters. Note that it is obvious from the table that the presented designs are more complex
and therefore have higher area complexities as compared to the Radix-2 designs espe-
cially higher-radix PIM multipliers. This is because of using more resources to execute
operations in parallel. However, among these PIM designs, it is shown that BE logic
helps to reduce the area complexity compared to non BE designs. For example, in the
Table 4.4, it is shown that R4BPIM requires 6Aadd, 17Amux and four n-bit registers. The
same design without BE logic i.e., R4PIM has an area complexity of 8Aadd, 14Amux and
five n-bit registers.
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Figure 4.5: Resource requirements of IM multipliers
Table 4.5: Latency analysis of IM multipliers
Design Critical Path (Tclk) # clock cycles Latency
R2IM [86] 3tadd + 2tmux n+ 1 (n+ 1)× Tclk
R2PIM [100] 2tadd + 2tmux (n+ 1) (n+ 1)× Tclk
R4BIM 4tadd + 5tmux (bn/2c+ 3) (bn/2c+ 3)× Tclk
R4PIM 2tadd + 4tmux (bn/2c+ 5) (bn/2c+ 5)× Tclk
R4BPIM 2tadd + 7tmux (bn/2c+ 3) (bn/2c+ 3)× Tclk
R8BIM 5tadd + 6tmux (bn/3c+ 5) (bn/3c+ 5)× Tclk
R8PIM 3tadd + 4tmux (bn/3c+ 7) (bn/3c+ 7)× Tclk
R8BPIM 3tadd + 4tmux (bn/3c+ 5) (bn/3c+ 5)× Tclk
‡ Total clock cycles (#clk), clock period (tclk), adder (add), multiplexer
(mux)
A more clear picture can be observed by comparing area complexities of R8PIM3
and R8BPIM designs. R8BPIM requires fewer adders and registers as compared to
R8PIM as demonstrated in Table 4.4.
4.6.2 Critical Path and Latency
Table 4.5 lists critical path delay and latency of the IM multipliers. In the table tadd and
tmux represent time delay of a n-bit adder and a n-bit (2:1) multiplexer. Moreover, a
critical path delay which determines the minimum clock period and is denoted as Tclk.
The design reported in [86] is a serial radix-2 implementation with a critical path delay
of 3tadd + 2tmux and it takes n + 1 clock cycles to perform a modular multiplication
operation.
The design in [100] is based on parallel radix-2 approach with a Tclk delay of
3R8PIM is extension of R4PIM design and it is not presented in this work
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2tadd + 2tmux , which is a saving of one tadd in the minimum clock period Tclk as com-
pared to the serial radix-2 approach and it also takes n+ 1 clock cycles.
The R4BIM and R8BIM multipliers take b n2c+ 3, b n3c+ 5 clock cycles respectively,
which is almost 50% and 66% reduction in the number of clock cycles as compared
to the designs reported in [86] and [100]. However these designs exhibit longer crit-
ical paths as shown in Table 4.5. The parallel versions of these multipliers (R4PIM,
R4BPIM, R8PIM, R8BPIM) have critical path delays comparable to the IM bit-level
implementation. It is worth mentioning that the parallel higher-radix IM multipliers
consumes almost the same number of clock cycles to compute a modular multiplica-
tion operation as serial higher-radix multipliers (R4BIM, R8BIM). However, their crit-
ical path delay Tclk delay is half of the serial higher-radix Tclk delay. Therefore, these
designs can provide almost 50% speed-up to a modular multiplication operation as
compared to the design in [98] and [100].
4.7 Implementation Results
This sections presents implementation results and performance evaluation of higher-
radix Booth encoded parallel interleaved multipliers. The multipliers are coded in
Verilog HDL and Xilinx ISE 14.2 Design Suite is used for synthesis, mapping, placement
and routing purposes targeting Virtex-6 FPGA device XCV6LX550. The Xilinx ISIM
simulator is used for behavioral simulation of the designs. A software implementation
of the proposed multipliers is done in C#. The outputs from the simulator tool and the
software are compared to verify the correctness of the designs by applying different
test inputs.
The proposed multipliers in this chapter are also implemented in Addition and
subtraction are performed making use of in-built fast carry chains of the device using
carry select approach [100]. Performance of the designs are compared in two stages.
In the first stage the designs are analysed and compared on the basis of computation
time, FPGA occupied resources, maximum attainable frequency, and the number of
required clock cycles. In the second stage, performance of these parallel designs are
compared against other designs reported in the literature on the basis of area-delay
product, throughput, and (throughput / slice area).
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Table 4.6: Area results of Virtex-6 FPGA implementation of Parallel IM multipliers
Design Platform Field siz (p) Area (slices) LUTsb Slice registers
R4PIM Virtex 6 256 1985 6300 2187
224 1745 5367 1883
192 1519 4641 1625
160 1268 3780 1366
R4BPIM Virtex 6 256 1631 4935 1382
224 1496 4427 1221
192 1395 3846 1057
160 1042 3184 910
R8PIM Virtex 6 256 4428 13880 2756
224 4014 12737 2436
192 3631 10520 2116
160 3191 8821 1795
R8BPIM Virtex 6 256 3622 10284 1952
224 3326 9115 1727
192 2745 7728 1502
160 2306 6334 1276
aLook-up-tables
4.7.1 Area Results
FPGA area consumption of the designs are listed in Table 4.6 for four different field
sizes p (160, 192, 224, 256). The R4PIM design consumes 1985 FPGA slices (including
6300 LUTs and 2187 slice registers) while computing a 256-bit modular multiplication
operation. The R8PIM design for the same bit length consumes 4428 slices (includ-
ing 13880 LUTs, 2756 slice registers), which is almost 2.23 times more than R4PIM
multiplier design.
Similarly, the R4BPIM design consumes 1631 slices (including 4935 LUTs and 1382
slice registers) which is almost 18% fewer FPGA slices as compared to the R4PIM
design. On the other hand, R8BPIM design occupies 3622 FPGA slices (including
10284 LUTs and 1952 slice registers) which is again almost 18% saving in slice area
as compared to the R8PIM design. A graphical view of the area consumption of the
designs is shown in Figure 4.6. Therefore, it is evident from the table that BE logic in
the higher-radix parallel IM multipliers helps to lower their area cost.
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Figure 4.6: Area comparison of parallel IM multipliers
4.7.2 Execution Time Results
Execution time of a modular multiplication operation by the higher-radix parallel IM
multipliers are listed in Table 4.7. The R4PIM design computes a 256-bit modular mul-
tiplication operation in 0.8 us while running at a maximum frequency of 166 MHz. The
R8PIM design takes 0.74 us to compute the same bit length operation at a maximum
frequency of 124.4 MHz.
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Figure 4.7: Time comparison of higher-radix parallel IM multipliers
The R4BPIM design takes 0.94 us to compute a 256-bit modular multiplication
while running at 137.9 MHz. It is 17.5% slower than the R4PIM design. A similar
conclusion can be drawn by comparing the R8PIM and the R8BPIM designs in the
table. Therefore, it shows that BE logic in higher-radix parallel IM multipliers can de-
crease the design space complexity, with slight degradation in the speed performance
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Table 4.7: Timing results of Higher-radix Parallel IM multipliers on Virtex-6 FPGA
Design Field size (p) Frequency (MHz) #Clock cycle Time (us)
R4PIM 256 166 133 0.8
224 167.6 117 0.7
192 168.7 101 0.6
160 173 85 0.5
R4BPIM 256 137.87 131 0.94
224 142.7 115 0.8
192 145.7 99 0.68
160 147 83 0.56
R8PIM 256 124.4 92 0.74
224 127.6 81 0.63
192 132.6 71 0.54
160 136 60 0.44
R8BPIM 256 123.43 90 0.73
224 125.7 79 0.63
192 127 69 0.54
160 128.4 58 0.45
as compared to the non BE higher-radix parallel IM multipliers. A comparison of time
taken by the higher-radix parallel IM multipliers to compute a modular multiplication
operation of different field sizes is shown in Figure 4.7.
4.8 Performance Evaluation and Analysis
Table 4.8 presents performance evaluation of the different IM based modular multi-
pliers. Note that R4BIM and R8BIM designs are presented in Chapter 3 while R2IM
and R2PIM are reported in [103] and [99,100]. The table shows occupied FPGA slices
for different designs against their performance in terms of maximum frequency and
computation time and it also lists synthesis results of the designs against four different
field sizes (160, 192, 224, 256).
The implementation results listed in Table 4.8 for R2IM and R2PIM designs are the
implementation results on Virtex-6 platform. The available implementation results
in the literature for these designs are on different FPGA platforms, therefore, these
have been carefully implemented on the same Virtex-6 platform along with the other
proposed modular multipliers in this work.
From the synthesized results in Table 4.8 it is clear that the presented multipliers
are better in terms of computation time. For example for 256-bit field size, the R4PIM
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Figure 4.8: Time comparison of different IM multipliers
is upto 2.6, 1.89 times faster than R2IM and R2PIM designs, respectively. However it
consumes 1.96, 1.66 times more FPGA slices as compared to R2IM and R2PIM designs,
respectively. Similar conclusion can be drawn for the other designs. It is also worth
noticing that the serial IM multipliers (R4BIM, R8BIM) are significantly slower than
the Parallel IM multipliers. This is because the parallel IM multipliers (R4PIM, R8PIM)
introduced parallelism inspired by the Montgomery powering ladder technique to ex-
ecute the internal operations in parallel, while the R4BIM, R8BIM multipliers execute
internal operations in a serial fashion.
Comparison of time required to perform a modular multiplication by different mul-
tipliers is shown in Figure 4.8 and hardware resource utilization is shown in Figure
4.9.
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Table 4.8: Virtex-6 FPGA implementation results of different IM multipliers
Design Field size (p) size Area LUTs Slice Freq Time
(slices) registers (MHz) (us)
R2IM 160 631 1733 531 136.8 1.18
192 757 2049 627 131.6 1.46
224 993 2401 723 129 1.74
256 1012 2900 777 125 2.03
R2PIM 160 712 2002 691 191 0.84
192 910 2401 819 184.6 1.04
224 995 2787 947 179.1 1.25
256 1190 3207 1075 174 1.48
R4BIM 160 1186 2911 556 91.6 0.88
192 1272 3511 652 89 1.08
224 1447 4053 748 87.3 1.29
256 1550 4606 845 85.5 1.5
R4PIM 160 1268 3780 1366 173 0.5
192 1519 4641 1625 168.7 0.6
224 1745 5367 1883 167.6 0.7
256 1985 6300 2187 166 0.8
R4BPIM 160 1042 3184 910 147 0.56
192 1395 3846 1057 145.7 0.68
224 1496 4427 1221 142.7 0.8
256 1631 4935 1382 137.87 0.94
R8BIM 160 1320 3234 562 77 0.752
192 1442 4119 659 75.7 0.89
224 1424 4549 755 73.2 1.07
256 1820 5149 851 72 1.24
R8PIM 160 3191 8821 1795 136 0.44
192 3631 10520 2116 132.6 0.54
224 4014 12737 2436 127.6 0.63
256 4428 13880 2756 124.4 0.74
R8BPIM 160 2306 6334 1276 128.4 0.45
192 2745 7728 1502 127 0.54
224 3326 9115 1727 125.7 0.63
256 3622 10284 1952 123.43 0.73
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Figure 4.10: Performance evaluation of IM multipliers
4.9 Throughput and Area-Delay Product
The performance of different IM multiplier designs are evaluated basd on throughput
(thr), area-delay product per bit (ATB), and (thr/slices) given in Table 4.9 and Figure
4.10. In the table α factor is a measure of throughput/ slice area, higher α factor indi-
cates that a design is better optimized for throughput and area, while lower ATB value
indicates that a design is better optimized for computation time and area. Therefore,
a design having a low ATB value and high α factor is optimized for a good trade-off
between hardware resources, computation time, and throughput.
R4PIM and R4BPIM designs have low ATB and high α than the other designs listed
in Table 4.9. Moreover, the R4PIM design has a slightly higher ATB value than that
of the R4BPIM design with an almost same α factor. Therefore, these designs are
suitable for those applications where performance and resource consumption are of
equal importance. On the other hand, R8PIM and R8BPIM have high ATB values
with low α factor, which indicates that these designs have higher throughput rate as
compared to the other listed designs. Therefore, these designs are suitable for very
high performance applications.
R4BIM and R8BIM are not using parallelism, hence, they execute the main oper-
ations of IM algorithm in a serial fashion. Although these designs consume almost
the same amount of clock cycles to perform a modular multiplication operation, how-
ever due to the serial nature of the designs they have longer critical path delays as
compared to the R4PIM, R4BPIM, R8PIM and R8BPIM.
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Table 4.9: Throughput and area-delay product of different IM multipliers
Design Field siz (p) 1ATB 2Thr. (bps) α=(Thr / slice area)
R2IM [86] 224-bits 7.71 128.7 M 0.1296
256-bits 8.02 126.1 M 0.1245
R2PIM [100] 224-bits 5.55 179.2 M 0.1801
256-bits 6.92 171.8 M 0.1443
R4BIM 224-bits 8.33 173.6 M 0.1199
256-bits 9.08 171.8 M 0.1108
R4PIM 224-bits 5.45 320 M 0.1833
256-bits 6.2 320 M 0.1612
R4BPIM 224-bits 5.34 280 M 0.1871
256-bits 5.98 272.3 M 0.1669
R8BIM 224-bits 6.80 209.3 M 0.1469
256-bits 8.81 206.4 M 0.1134
R8PIM 224-bits 11.28 356 M 0.0886
256-bits 12.79 346 M 0.0781
R8BPIM 224-bits 9.35 356 M 0.1070
256-bits 10.32 351 M 0.0969
1 Area-delay product per bit (ATB)
2 Throughput (Thr) bits per second (bps)
R4BPIM design has the lowest area-delay product. R8BPIM has the same through-
put but much lower area-delay product as compared to the R8PIM. These comparisons
indicate that introducing BE and parallelism in the IM algorithm result in speed and
area optimized modular multipliers. Figure 4.11 shows comparison of the IM mul-
tipliers, where radix-2 Montgomery multiplier design (R2MM) in [105] computes a
256-bit modular multiplication operation in 1.68 us and consumes 947 slices. It is
clear that R4PIM and R4BPIM are better optimized for speed and resources. R4PIM
design requires more adders and fewer multiplexers as compared to the R4BPIM de-
sign which ultimately results in more FPGA slice consumption. This is because of the
fact that a multiplexer is a simple circuit as compared to an adder and requires few
logic resources.
R4PIM design is more suitable for high speed applications, therefore it is utilized
in the design of EC scalar multiplier presented in the next chapter.
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4.10 Conclusion
Higher-radix based multipliers are faster because of their lower iteration count as
compared to the bit-level implementation. However, these techniques deteriorate the
critical path delays, which limit their maximum achievable clock frequencies and de-
sired performance. To obtain a maximum performance optimization techniques can
be explored to reduce the critical path delay in higher-radix multiplier designs. Par-
allelization is one such optimization technique that reduces the computation time by
reducing the critical path delay.
This chapter shows that there is a good scope of parallelism in the design of inter-
leaved multipliers presented in Chapter 3. It first identifies independent operations in
the designs and then presents parallel high performance hardware architectures that
facilitate the parallel execution of these independent operations. The chapter also
presents a comprehensive performance analysis of the parallel and serial higher-radix
interleaved multipliers.
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Chapter 5
EC Scalar Multiplier Architectures
Public-key cryptography (PKC) has solved many problems that were previously con-
sidered impractical such as key exchange, digital signatures, etc [25]. Most of the PKC
protocols are based on two efficient schemes: RSA [3] and elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) [1], [2]. Recommendations by different standards [112] indicate that 256-bit
ECC implementation is capable of providing an equivalent security in comparison to
3072-bit RSA. This gap of the required number of bits in ECC and RSA is expected to
increase further in future due to higher security demands. Therefore, due to the much
smaller key sizes for same level of security, the ECC based crypto-systems are better
in terms of bandwidth utilization, power consumption, and implementation cost as
compared to the traditional RSA based crypto-systems.
ECC is particularly useful in resource constrained devices because ECC requires
lower implementation and transmission cost and thus lower power consumption [113].
ECC will find applications in the Internet of thing, where more and more resource con-
strained devices will be connected to the Internet.
This chapter presents efficient EC scalar multiplier architectures using affine and
projective coordinates. On the system level, double-and-add and always-double-add
algorithms are adopted. The presented EC scalar multiplier architectures are designed
using the radix-4 parallel interleaved multiplier presented in Chapter 4.
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5.1 Introduction And Related Work
Elliptic curve scalar multiplication is a fundamental and computationally intensive
operation in nearly all ECC based crypto-systems. It is the multiplication of a scalar
(integer) value to a point on an elliptic curve. Mathematically it is denoted as, Q = dP,
where a point P and a scalar d are multiplied together to generate another point Q on
the curve. In this scenario, points P and Q are public parameters, while scalar d is a
secret value that is used in the process of secure encryption.
Mathematically, finding the secret d, while knowing the public parameters P and
Q is known as the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). The hardness
of the ECDLP is the basis of the security of all ECC crypto-systems. However, ECDLP
can be bypassed by exploiting several algorithmic and implementation weaknesses
termed as side channel attacks (SCA) [114]. For example, if an adversary somehow
gains access to a cryptographic device, then the adversary may be able to figure out d
by monitoring timing and power consumption profiles of the device. The most simple
and common SCAs are based on timing and simple power analysis [31]. There are also
more sophisticated attacks based on fault injection, differential power analysis [32],
and many others [33], [34]. This work focuses on the efficient implementation of EC
scalar multiplication that provides resistance to only timing and simple power analysis
attacks. These attacks are simple and more common in practice, strategies to fight
against these type of attacks need to be incorporated in any cryptosystem.
Their are different EC representations such as short Weierstrass, Edwards [115],
Twisted Edwards [116], Montgomery [117, 118], etc. Currently most security proto-
cols use EC in short Weierstrass representation. Although EC point multiplication on
the other mentioned curves are faster than on the short Weierstrass representation,
these are not standardised yet. Therefore, the focus of this research is on the efficient
implementation of EC scalar multiplication using short Weierstrass representation.
A number of hardware architectures have been reported to efficiently compute the
EC scalar multiplication operation [46, 47, 51, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69,
71, 103, 119]. Among these, [46], [47], [119] are based on elliptic curves (ECs) and
prime fields recommended by the US National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) [85], while all other designs support any general prime field GF(p). A
comprehensive overview of EC scalar multiplier hardware architectures can be found
91
5.2. ELLIPTIC CURVE SCALAR MULTIPLICATION
in [44], [73]. Typically, NIST based designs are superior in terms of performance,
however they are less flexible compared to design over general GF(p). All these de-
signs developed EC scalar multiplier architecture using standard EC Weierstrass, EW,
representation. EC scalar multiplier architecture in [43] is developed over binary Ed-
wards curves, which imposes completely different design challenges, whereas [70] is
a hardware implementation over twisted Edwards curves [116]. EC group operations
in EW representation using affine (x , y) coordinates have limited parallelism scope
at low level finite field arithmetic operations, whereas in projective coordinates sev-
eral possible parallelism strategies can be devised based on the available finite field
primitives.
5.2 Elliptic curve scalar multiplication
Algorithm 11: Double-and-add (DA) method for EC point multiplication [16]
Input: An integer d =
∑n−1
i=0 di · 2i and a point P on elliptic curve
Output: dP
1 Q← 0
2 for (i = n− 1; i ≥ 0; i = i − 1) do
3 Q← 2Q // EC Point doubling //
4 if (di = 1) then
5 Q←Q + P // EC Point addition //
6 end
7 end
8 return Q
Algorithm 12: Double-and-always-add (DAA) for EC point multiplication [16,
56]
Input: An integer d =
∑n−1
i=0 di · 2i and a point P on elliptic curve
Output: d = dP
1 Q0← P, Q1← 0
2 for (i = 0; i ≤ n− 1; i = i + 1) do
3 Q2←Q0 +Q1 // EC Point addition //
4 Q0← 2Q0 // EC Point doubling //
5 Q1←Q(1+di)
6 end
7 return Q1
As EC crypto-systems are mostly based on the EC scalar multiplication operation,
therefore several methods have been proposed to compute this operation [16]. All
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of these methods compute the EC scalar multiplication operation as a sequence of EC
point addition (PA) and EC point doubling (PD) operations. Algorithm 11 presents
a left-to-right binary method for EC point multiplication. The algorithm encodes the
scalar (d) in binary format and always performs EC PD operation as shown in step 3,
whereas the EC PA operation is executed if the respective scalar bit is one. The total
number of iterations in the algorithm is exactly equal to the number of required bits
to represent the scalar d. This technique is often known as standard double-and-add
(DA) method for EC scalar multiplication.
Note that in the DA method EC PA is dependent of the respective scalar bit i.e., di.
In other words the number of EC PA operations depends on the Hamming weight of
the scalar d and on an average of any binary number, half of the bits are non-zero.
Therefore, the computational complexity of EC point multiplication using DA method
is n× PD + n/2× PA, where n is the number of bits of d in binary representation.
It is also worth mentioning that the EC PA and PD operations in the DA method
can not be executed in parallel. The computational complexities of PA and PD op-
erations are different which is discussed in the next section. Therefore, an attacker
can easily distinguish between these two operations by tracing timing and power con-
sumption of the device and ultimately can reveal the bits being processed for the scalar
d. Therefore, this method is vulnerable to most of the side-channel-attacks including
the very simple timing and simple power analysis attacks [31], [32], [120], [121],
[122], [123], [124], [125].
Algorithm 12 shows another method for EC point multiplication, known as double-
and-always-add (DAA) [16,56]. The DAA also works on the binary representation of
the scalar d as well. Note that the PA operation in algorithm 12 is not dependant on
the bit pattern of d, so these operations can be performed in parallel. As the PD and
PA operations can be executed concurrently, therefore the DAA method gives an ex-
tra feature of protection against timing and simple power analysis (SPA) attacks [31].
However, it is not adequate to fight against more sophisticated attacks such as differ-
ential power analysis [32], differential fault analysis [126, 127] and electromagnetic
radiation based attacks [128,129]. Resistance against these attacks are not the focus
of this work.
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5.2.1 EC Point Operations Using Affine Coordinates
This work considers an elliptic curve E, defined over prime field GF(p), where p is
a large prime characteristic number. Field elements are represented as integers in
the range [0 → p − 1]. An elliptic curve E over GF(p) in short Weierstrass form is
represented as
E : y2 = x3 + ax + b (5.1)
Where, a, b, x , and y ∈ GF(p) and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (modulo p). The set of all points
(x , y) that satisfy (5.1), plus the point at∞make an abelian group. EC point addition
and EC point doubling operations over such groups are used to construct many elliptic
curve cryptosystems. The EC point addition and EC point doubling operations in affine
coordinates can be represented as follows: let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) are two
points on the elliptic curve. The group operation is the point addition, P3(x3, y3) =
P1(x1, y1) + P2(x2, y2) which is defined by the group law and is given as
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2 (5.2)
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 (5.3)
where
λ=

y2−y1
x2−x1 if P1 6= P2
3x21+a
2y1
if P1 = P2
(5.4)
If, P1 = P2 then a special case of adding a point to itself is called the EC point dou-
bling operation. In affine coordinates the EC point addition requires one division (D),
two multiplication (M) and six addition or subtraction (A) operations, whereas the PD
operation can be performed by using one (D) , three (M) and eight (A) operations.
Tables 5.1 depicts the number of field operations (FOP) for EC PD and PA opera-
tions. Therefore, using the DA method for EC scalar multiplication a single iteration
of the algorithm requires 14A+5M+2D underlying field operations.
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Table 5.1: EC point operations using affine coordinates [16,28,29]
Point addition, (PA) Point doubling, (PD) No of field operations (FOP)
x3 = λ2 − (x1 + x2) x3 = λ2 − (x1 + x1) PA = 6A+2M+1D
Y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
λ= (y2 − y1)/(x2 − x1) λ= (3x21 + a)/2y1 PD = 8A+3M+1D
Point addition (PA), Point doubling (PD), Field operation (FOP), modular addition/subtraction (A), modular division
(D)
5.3 EC Scalar Multiplier Architecture in Affine Coordi-
nates
This section presents an architecture to compute the EC scalar multiplication operation
using affine coordinates. It consists of three modular arithmetic units, a modular
adder/subtractor (A/S), a modular multiplier (Mul) and a modular divider (Div). A/S
unit performs either modular addition or subtraction operation at a time in a single
clock cycle, while the Div unit takes 2n clock cycles to compute an n-bit modular
division operation as discussed in Chapter 3. The Mul unit is based on the radix-
4 parallel interleaved multiplier ( R4PIM ) presented in Chapter 4. Implementation
results making use of other multipliers presented in Chapter 4 are given in appendix
A.
In Chapter 4 it is discussed that the R4PIM multiplier completes an n-bit modular
multiplication operation in bn/2c+5 clock cycle. The EC scalar multiplier performance
results are shown for different field sizes. The architecture in Figure 5.1 also consists of
instruction memory, register file and a control unit. The instruction memory is loaded
with micro-coded instructions, the register file is responsible for storing intermediate
and final results while the control unit generates the necessary control signals to exe-
cute the required operations. The register file consists of two separate sets of registers,
dedicated purpose registers (DPR) and general purpose registers(GPR). The schedul-
ing of finite field operations to perform EC PD and PA operations in affine coordinates
are given in Table 5.2 and 5.3 respectively.
It is worth mentioning using the DA method EC PD and PA operations can not be
executed concurrently. It is also visible from Table 5.2 that scope of parallelism inside
these operations are also very limited, therefore, the EC scalar multiplier architecture
incorporated a single A/S, Mul and Div units as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: EC scalar multiplier architecture using affine coordinates
Normally, to achieve a better performance of EC point multiplication on dedicated
hardware, multiple copies of modular adder, subtractor, multiplier and divider units
are integrated. These multiple copies can help to execute several operations in parallel
at the expense of extra area and cost. As mentioned before when using the DA method,
EC PD and PA operations can not be computed in parallel. The scope of parallelism
in affine coordinates is also very limited, therefore integration of multiple arithmetic
units can not be fully exploited to achieve a significant performance increase.
However, EC point PA and EC point PD operations can be executed in parallel using
DAA method for EC point multiplication irrespective of the di as shown in algorithm
12. As these EC point operations do not depend on the ith bit of the scalar d, hence,
timing and power consumption of these operations are symmetric and it is not be
possible for an attacker to extract any information regarding secret value d. There-
fore this technique provides a protection against timing and simple power analysis
attacks. To defy timing and simple power analysis attacks, the DAA method computes
a PA operation in every iteration irrespective of the respective scalar bit. Therefore, it
computes 100% more PA operations as compared to the DA method. However, DAA
provides a flexibility to compute EC PD and PA operations concurrently. Therefore,
this work integrates two instances of the arithmetic unit (AU1 and AU2) to execute
EC PD and PA operations as shown in Figure 5.2. Each of these arithmetic units in-
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Table 5.2: Scheduling of PD operation in affine coordinates
A/S Mul Div
A1 = y1 + y1 M1 = x1 × x1
A2 = x1 + x1
A3 = M1 + M1
A4 = A3 + M1
A5 = A4 + a
D1 = A5 ÷ A1
M2 = D1 × D1
A6(x3) = M2 − A2
A7 = x1 − A6
M3 = A7 × D1
A8(y3) = M3 − y1
Table 5.3: Scheduling of PA operation in affine coordinates
A/S Mul Div
A1 = y2 − y1
A2 = x2 − x1
A3 = x1 + x2 D1 = A1 ÷ A2
M1 = D1 × D1
A4(x3) = M1 − A3
A5 = x1 − A4
M2 = D1 × A5
A6(y3) = M2 − y1
corporates a single unit of A/S, Mul and Div, therefore, in total two A/S, two Mul and
two Div units are integrated in the overall architecture. AU1 is responsible to execute
EC PD operation while AU2 computes EC PA operation according to Table 5.2 and 5.3
respectively. From Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 it is evident that the computational time
of an EC PD operation is more than that of an EC PA operation.Therefore, the overall
computational time of a scalar multiplication is dependent on the time taken by a PD
operation in case of the DAA method given in algorithm 12.
MulA/S
a0 a1 b1b0 b2a2
out0 out1 out2
p
D1 D2
Cin st1 st2
clk
reset
Div MulA/S
a0 a1 b1b0 b2a2
out0 out1 out2
p
D1
D2
Cin st1 st2
clk
reset
Div
AU2
AU1
Figure 5.2: Arithmetic units for parallel execution of PD and PA operations
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5.3.1 Latency
An EC PD operation using the R4PIM multiplier can be completed in (7bn/2c + 24)
clock cycles and an EC PA operation requires (3n+ 19) clock cycles.
5.3.2 Using double-and-add (DA) method
As it has been pointed out that the DA method does not provide the flexibility to com-
pute PD and PA operations in parallel. Therefore, using DA method the computational
complexity of EC scalar multiplication operation is n× PD +n/2× PA. Therefore the
latency of the EC scalar multiplication operation is given below.
TDA = n(7bn/2c+ 24) + n/2(3n+ 19) (5.5)
Equation (5.5) shows the latency of an EC scalar multiplication operation using the
R4PIM multiplier.
5.3.3 Using double-and-always-add (DAA) method
Using the DAA method PD and PA operations can be performed in parallel, therefore
the latency of an EC scalar multiplication operation is n× PD (PD is slower than PA)
using the R4PIM multiplier is given in equation (5.6).
TDAA = n(7bn/2c+ 24) (5.6)
5.4 Implementation Results
The implementation results of the EC scalar multiplier architecture using affine coor-
dinates on Virtex-6 FPGA is given in Table 5.4. It is obvious that the the proposed EC
scalar multiplier architecture based on DA method is slower than the DAA method.
This is because of the parallel execution of the EC PA and PD operations on two arith-
metic units using the DAA method. In the case of DA method these EC group opera-
tions are executed on a single arithmetic unit.
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Table 5.4: Implementation of EC scalar multiplier using affine coor-
dinates
Field size Area (slices) Freq. (MHz) clock cycles Time (ms)
Using DA method on a single AU unit
192-any 3551 137 191, 904 1.4
224-any 4023 134 258, 384 1.93
256-any 4807 131 336, 256 2.6
Using DAA method on two parallel AU units
192-any 7152 137 133, 632 0.98
224-any 7976 134 180, 992 1.35
256-any 9213 131 235, 520 1.8
Computation time of an EC scalar multiplication of a 256-bit field size using the
DA method with a single arithmetic unit takes 2.6 ms and 336,256 clock cycles. It
occupies 4807 FPGA slices and is able to operate at a maximum clock frequency of 131
MHz. Using the DAA method and two parallel arithmetic units, a 256-bit EC scalar
multiplication operation is completed in 1.8 ms in 235,520 clock cycles. It shows that
the DAA method, due to parallel execution of the PA and PD operations is 1.4 times
faster than the DA method. However, due to utilizing two separate copies of the AU
unit it consumes 9213 slices which is 1.9 times more than the design based on the DA
method. In [56] dual core architecture of the EC scalar multiplier using DAA method
completes the 256-bit operation in 7.7 ms which is almost 4.3 times slower than the
proposed EC scalar multiplier.
5.5 EC Point Operations Using Projective Coordinates
Elliptic curve point representation in affine coordinates requires modular inversion
or division operations to compute both PD and PA operations. It is the most expen-
sive operation in terms of computation time and resource consumption. In order to
speed up these group operations different projective coordinates systems have been
explored. Using projective coordinates has the advantage of eliminating modular in-
version/division from the EC group operations at the cost of more modular multipli-
cation operations. Typically at the end, one or two modular inversions are required to
re-map from projective to affine space as shown in Figure 2.4. In this work standard
projective coordinates are used in an EC scalar multiplier design.
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Table 5.5: EC PD operation in standard projective coordi-
nates [28], [29]
Point addition, PD No Of field operation(FOP)
w = 3(X1 − Z1)× (X1 + Z1)
s = 2Y1 × Z1
ss = s× s
sss = ss× s
R = Y1 × s 10M+11A
RR = R× R
B = 2× X1 × R
h = w2 − 2B
X3 = h× s
Y3 = w× (b− h)− 2RR
Z3 = sss
Point addition (PA), Point doubling (PD), Field operation (FOP), modular addition/-
subtraction (A),
• In Projective coordinates space an affine point P(x , y) corresponds to the point
P(X Z−1, Y Z−1, Z), where Z 6= 0. If set Z = 1 then it is trivial to map the points
from affine to projective space as shown below.
(x , y) 7−→ (X , Y, 1), X = x , Y = y, Z = 1
• At the end of the EC scalar multiplication operation, conversion from projective
to affine space is performed as follows:
x = X Z−1, y = Y Z−1
An elliptic curve in short Weierstrass form in affine coordinates after transformation
to projective coordinates is given in equation (5.7) [15], [16]
Y 2Z = X 3 + aX Z2 + bZ3 (5.7)
The EC PA and EC PD formulae reported in [28], [29] and are listed in Tables 5.5 and
5.6 respectively. The number of field operations (FOP) required for an EC PD operation
in projective settings is ten modular multiplications (M) plus eleven modular additions
(A) i.e., 10M+11A while for EC PA operation the number of required FOP is 14M+7A.
Therefore, a single iteration of DA and DAA algorithms require twenty four time
critical modular multiplications and relatively cheaper eighteen modular addition op-
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Table 5.6: EC PA operation in standard projective coordinates
[28], [29]
Point addition, PA No Of field operations (FOP)
Y1Z2 = Y1 × Z2
X1Z2 = X1 × Z2
Z1Z2 = Z1 × Z2
u = Y2 × Z1 − Y1Z2
uu = u× u
v = X2 × Z1 − X1Z2 14M+7A
vv = v × v
vvv = vv × v
R = vv × X1Z2
A= uu× Z1Z2 − vvv − 2R
X3 = v × A
Y3 = u× (R− A)− vvv × Y1Z2
Z3 = vvv × Z1Z2
Point addition (PA), Point doubling (PD), Field operation (FOP), modular addition/subtrac-
tion (A),
erations. The chosen EC point doubling and EC point addition formulae are based
on the assumption that the EC parameter a = −3, which is commonly used in many
standard elliptic curves. For further details see [28], [29].
5.6 EC Scalar Multiplier Architecture in Projective Co-
ordinates
In this section, a high performance architecture to perform the EC scalar multiplication
operation over general prime field is developed. It performs the EC scalar multiplica-
tion operation using standard projective coordinates. To compute EC group operations
i.e., EC PD and EC PA, a high speed arithmetic unit (AU) is developed first and is de-
scribed in the next section.
5.6.1 Arithmetic Unit
When EC points are represented in affine coordinates, the scope of parallelism among
the underlying finite field arithmetic operations is very limited, integration of multiple
arithmetic units does not significantly reduce the computation time of EC scalar mul-
tiplication operation. EC points are represented using standard projective coordinates
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Mul1 Mul2 Mul3A/S
a0 a1 b1b0 b2a2 a3 b3
out0 out1 out2 out3
p
D1 D2 D3
Cin st1 st2 st3
clk
reset
Figure 5.3: Proposed arithmetic unit (AU)
Table 5.7: Field operations on AU unit
Control signals Field operation Execution unit clock cycles
Cin = 0 out0 = a0 + b0 A/S 1
Cin = 1 out0 = a0 − b0 A/S 1
st1 = 1 out1 = a1 × b1 MUL1 b n2c+ 5
st2 = 1 out2 = a2 × b2 MUL2 b n2c+ 5
st3 = 1 out3 = a3 × b3 MUL3 b n2c+ 5
in this section. It is evident from Tables 5.5 and 5.6 that there is a significant scope
of parallelism which can be exploited to speed up EC scalar multiplication operation,
this is the motivation of integrating parallel dedicated modular multipliers in an AU
unit. Latency of a modular addition/subtraction is only a single clock cycle so only a
single A/S unit is integrated to reduce the area cost. Therefore a single addition or
subtraction instruction can be performed by the AU unit at a time.
The arithmetic unit (AU) shown in Figure 5.3 consists of three dedicated modular
multipliers and a single modular adder/subtracter (A/S) units. The three modular
multiplication units are named as MUL1, MUL2, and MUL3, where each MUL unit is
based on the R4PIM multiplier given in chapter 4 so it performs a modular multipli-
cation instruction in b n2c + 5 clock cycles, whereas the A/S unit takes a single cycle
to execute a modular addition/subtraction instruction [98]. Therefore, the AU unit is
able to execute four independent modular instructions on their respective execution
units, concurrently. The AU unit receives eight independent operands (a0-a3, b0-b3)
and produces four independent results (out0-out3). Carry in (Cin) signal in the A/S
execution unit behaves as an operation selection signal, which determine whether
modular addition or subtraction is performed. If Cin = 1, then the A/S unit out-
puts out0 = (a0 − b0) modulo p, otherwise out0 = (a0 + b0) modulo p. The MUL1−3
execution units perform multiplication operations when their respective start signals
(st1− st3) are set to one. The done flags (D1−D3) indicate that the output is available
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Table 5.8: Scheduling of PD operation using three multipliers in projective coordi-
nates
A/S Mul1 Mul2 Mul3
A1 = X1 − Z1 M1 = Y1 × Z1
A2 = X1 + Z1
A3 = A1 + A1
A4 = A1 + A3
M2 = A4 × A2
A5 = M1 + M1
M3 = A5 × A5 M4 = M2 ×M2 M5 = Y1 × A5
Z3← M6 = M3 × A5 M8 = M5 ×M5 M7 = X1 ×M5
A6 = M7 + M7
A7 = A6 + A6
A8 = M4 − A7
A9 = A6 − A8 X3← M9 = A8 × A5
M10 = M2 × A9
A10 = M8 + M8
Y3← A11 = M10 − A10
at the respective output ports (out1-out3), which are set to one after b n2c+ 5 clock cy-
cles. The instructions with their corresponding execution units and control signals are
shown in Table 5.7, where on the basis of the control signals the respective execution
unit is active and performs the respective operation. The given AU unit takes eight
n-bit input operands produces four n-bit outputs, while the prime modulus p is made
directly available to the four execution units.
5.6.2 Scheduling of PD and PA Operations
The architecture in Figure 5.3 computes EC group operations PD and PA in standard
projective coordinates [28]. These PD and PA operations require a number of modu-
lar additions, subtractions, and multiplications which are listed in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
Table 5.5 also depicts that a PD computation requires 10M+11A operations, while
14M+7A operations are required to perform a PA operation in Table 5.6. As in the DA
algorithm these point operations can not be performed in parallel, therefore, a single
iteration of the algorithm requires twenty four modular multiplications and eighteen
modular addition/subtraction operations. Scheduling of these modular operations to
perform PD and PA operations are demonstrated in Table 5.8 and 5.9 respectively.
These operation schedules are based on the AU unit that consists of three dedicated
multipliers and a single A/S unit. Table 5.8 depicts that the field operations sequence
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Table 5.9: Scheduling of PA using three multipliers in projective coordinates
A/S Mul1 Mul2 Mul3
M1 = Y1 × Z2 M2 = X1 × Z2 M3 = Z1 × Z2
M4 = Y2 × Z1 M5 = X2 × Z1
A1 = M4 −M1
A2 = M5 −M2 M6 = A1 × A1
M7 = A2 × A2
M8 = M7 ×M2 M9 = M6 ×M3 M10 = M7 × A2
A3 = M8 + M8 M12 = M10 ×M1
A4 = M9 −M10
A5 = A4 − A3
A6 = M8 − A5 X3← M11 = A2 × A5 Z3← M14 = M10 ×M3
M13 = A1 × A6
Y3← A7 = M13 −M12
for a PD operation in which M1−10 indicate modular multiplications and A1−11 repre-
sent modular addition/subtraction operations. X3, Y3, Z3 are the resultant coordinates
of PD operation of point R(X1, Y1, Z1).
A PA operation requires 14M+7A field operations, which are executed in the se-
quence given in Table 5.9, where X3, Y3, Z3 are the coordinates of the resulting point
of adding points Q(X1, Y1, Z1) and R(X2, Y2, Z2). Note that, these low level field oper-
ations can be scheduled in several ways, however the schedule in the tables require
minimum number of clock cycles when using three parallel modular multipliers. Data
dependency graphs of PD and PA operations using three parallel multipliers are shown
in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.
The scheduling of the underlying field operations in the DAA algorithm is given in
Table 5.10 and a data dependency graph is shown in Figure 5.6. It is shown that using
four parallel multipliers a single iteration of the DAA algorithm can be completed in
n+35 clock cycles where each MUL1−4 takes bn/2c+5 clock cycles to perform an n-bit
modular multiplication operation using the R4PIM multiplier.
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Figure 5.4: Data dependency graph of PD operation using three multipliers
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Figure 5.5: Data dependency graph of PA operation using three multipliers
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Figure 5.7: EC scalar multiplier architecture
5.6.3 Overall Execution
The overall architecture of the proposed EC scalar multiplier using projective coordi-
nates is given in Figure 5.7. In addition to the AU unit, it also contains a register file,
instruction fetch and decode unit (IFD), instruction memory, and a controller. In order
to configure the AU unit to perform the respective operations, instructions are loaded
in the instruction memory. The controller generates a request to the IFD unit. Then,
the IFD unit fetches and decodes an instruction and generates appropriate signals to
configure the AU unit for smooth execution of the instruction.
As the instruction data dependencies and data hazards are known in advance,
therefore these microcoded instructions can be scheduled in a manner to get maximum
utilization of MUL1, MUL2, and MUL3 execution units of the AU based on the schedules
demonstrated in the Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10.
The AU unit performs four instructions in parallel, therefore it accesses eight in-
dependent input operands in parallel and produces four independent results. The
register file stores input points coordinates, modulus p, intermediate results, and the
coordinates of the resultant point. A very simple read and write mechanism for the
register file is adopted, where each data access (read/write) is based on hard-coded
control signals for the inputs and results multiplexing blocks, which are generated and
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Table 5.11: No of Clock cycles of EC scalar multiplication in projective coordinates
Method No of Mul PD PA EC scalar multiplication
DA
2 (5n/2+ 32) (7n/2+ 38) [n(5n/2+ 32) + n/2(7n/2+ 38)] + 4n
3 (2n+ 27) (3n+ 37) [n(2n+ 27) + n/2(3n+ 37)] + 4n
4 (2n+ 27) (2n+ 28) [n(2n+ 27) + n/2(2n+ 28)] + 4n
DAA
2 6n+ 61 [n(6n+ 61)] + 4n
3 4n+ 43 [n(4n+ 43)] + 4n
4 3n+ 35 [n(3n+ 35)] + 4n
managed by the controller and this avoids additional software development cost. It is
also worth mentioning that read and write to specific registers are completed in the
same clock cycle, which avoids unnecessary delay. The register file is grouped into
general purpose (GPR) and dedicated purpose registers (DPR). The GPR is updated
with intermediate results, while DPR holds the input operands in every iteration of
the DA and DAA algorithms.
5.6.4 Final Conversion
At the end of an EC scalar multiplication, the resultant coordinates (X , Y, Z) in stan-
dard projective coordinates need to be converted back to affine coordinates (x , y).
This conversion is done as x = X/Z , y = Y /Z , which requires two modular division
instructions. These modular division instructions are executed on the dedicated divi-
sion units (presented in chapter 3) based on extended Euclidean algorithm [16] in 4n
clock cycles (2n for each).
5.6.5 Latecny
Latencies of a single iteration of DA and DAA algorithms using multiple parallel multi-
pliers are given in Table 5.11. The table shows that using four parallel multipliers a sin-
gle iteration of DAA algorithm is completed in (3n+35) clock cycles. In total, there are
n iterations therefore EC scalar multiplication operation is completed in n(3n+35)+4n
clock cycles. The table also shows that using DAA algorithm, using four multipliers
the latency of a EC scalar multiplication operation is [n(2n+27)+n/2(2n+28)]+4n
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Table 5.12: Latency of EC scalar multiplication in projective coordinates
Method Mul n
Clock cycles
Freq (MHz) Time (ms)
PD PA EC Scalar Multiplication
DA
2
192 512 710 167, 232 154 1.08
224 592 822 225, 568 150 1.5
256 672 934 276, 096 146 2.01
3
192 411 613 138, 528 152 0.91
224 475 709 185, 808 147 1.26
256 539 805 242, 048 143 1.69
4
192 410 412 119, 232 151 0.79
224 475 486 160, 832 145 1.10
256 539 540 208, 128 141 1.47
Parallel PA and PD operations
DAA
2
192 1213 233, 664 154 1.51
224 1405 315, 616 150 2.1
256 1597 409, 856 146 2.8
3
192 811 156, 480 152 1.03
224 939 211, 232 147 1.44
256 1067 274, 176 143 1.92
4
192 611 118, 080 149 0.78
224 707 159, 264 145 1.09
256 803 206, 592 141 1.46
clock cycles. Note that extra 4n clock cycles in Table 5.11 are consumed in the final
conversion i.e., from projective to affine coordinates.
5.7 Implementation and Results
The EC scalar multiplier architectures are coded in Verilog (HDL). Xilinx ISE 14.1 de-
sign suite is used for synthesis, mapping, placement, and routing purposes and Xilinx
ISim simulator is used for simulation purposes. The R4PIM modular multiplier de-
scribed and implemented in chapter 4 is used. The EC points are represented in stan-
dard projective coordinates and the EC group operations are computed over standard
form of an EC. Tables 5.12 depicts latencies of EC PA , PD and scalar multiplication
operation against different field sizes when computed using DA and DAA methods by
incorporating different number of parallel multiplier units.
During synthesis Xilinx Virtex-6 device is selected as the target implementation
platform. The available fast carry chains of Xilinx FPGA are utilized to perform ad-
dition and subtraction operations. On the top level, the EC scalar multiplier is based
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Table 5.13: Implementation results of EC scalar multiplier
in projective coordinates
Method Multipliers n Area (slices) ATB TP (ops)
DA
2
192 5251 29.5 925.9
224 6048 40.5 666.6
256 7089 55.6 497.5
3
192 6952 32.9 1098.9
224 8108 45.6 793.6
256 9372 61.8 591.7
4
192 8731 35.9 1265.8
224 10, 115 49.6 909
256 11, 655 66.9 680.3
DAA
2
192 5432 42.7 666.6
224 6341 59.4 476.2
256 7235 79.1 357.1
3
192 7113 38.15 970.8
224 8341 53.6 694.4
256 9588 71.9 520.8
4
192 8897 36.14 1282
224 10, 291 50.07 917.4
256 11, 791 67.24 684.9
(Area × Time)/bits (ATB), Throughput (TP), EC scalar multi-
plication operations per second (ops)
on the DA and DAA algorithms. The DAA technique offers inherent protection against
timing and simple power analysis attacks. The presented designs are programmable
for various field sizes of p ≤ 256-bit.
It is obvious that incorporating more multiplier units reduces the computation time
of an EC scalar multiplication operation at the cost of more hardware resources. Note
that in the case of using four parallel multiplier units computation time of an EC
scalar multiplication operation using DA and DAA methods are comparable. Table
5.12 shows that a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication operation using DA method is com-
pleted in 208,128 clock cycles using four multipliers. The same bit length EC scalar
multiplication operation with the same multipliers using DAA method is completed in
206,592 clock cycles.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show that the DA method with three multipliers on Virtex-6
platform, a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication is completed in 1.69 ms in a cycle count
of 242K. It consumes 9372 slices and runs at a maximum frequency of 143 MHz with
a throughput of almost 592 operations per second (ops). Similarly, it is depicted that
when using four multipliers the same bit length operation is completed in 1.47 ms,
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consumes 11.65K slices and achieves a throughput of 680 ops. Which is 15% faster as
compared to the case of using three multipliers. However due to the integration of an
extra multiplier unit it consumes 20% more FPGA slices. Note that in the DA method
PA and PD operations are easily distinguishable because PA operation is dependent
on the bit value of the scalar d. Thus, the scalar d can be potentially revealed by
measuring timing or power consumption of the cryptographic device. Therefore DA
method is very susceptible to these side channel attacks.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 also demonstrate an implementation of scalar multiplication
using DAA method on Virtex-6 FPGA platform. In the DAA method PD and PA opera-
tions can be performed in an indistinguishable manner irrespective of the bit value of
the scalar d. A 256-bit EC scalar multiplication operation using four multipliers is com-
pleted in 1.46 ms, consumes 11.79K slices and attains a maximum frequency of 141
MHz with a throughput of 684.9 ops. Using DAA method for EC scalar multiplication
can protect the scalar d against timing and simple power analysis attacks.
It is obvious that incorporating more parallel multipliers will increase area con-
sumption and reduce the computation time of a EC scalar multiplication operation.
Area-delay product per bit (ATB) for a number of parallel multipliers is also given in
Table 5.13. ATB is higher for more multipliers with increased throughput rate. There-
fore, a choice of the number of multipliers depends on an application requirements.
If the application demands a very high speed design then four multipliers is the most
suitable option.
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5.7.1 Performance Evaluation
FPGA implementation of several other related designs are listed in Table 5.14. These
listed designs differ in different aspects: underlying implementation platform, chosen
prime number characteristics, underlying elliptic curve representation, points rep-
resentation, and the ability to countering different side channel attacks. A braod
overview the proposed design against other designs in different performance metrics
are listed in Table 5.14.
Designs reported in [46], [47] are based on NIST recommended elliptic curves over
prime fields, where a prime modulus p is of special form (close to a power of 2) called
pseudo-Mersenne Prime. Modular multiplications over this form of prime are much
faster due to simpler reduction steps which can be achieved by a few addition and sub-
traction operations instead of division as required in the case of a general prime field.
Therefore, typically implementations of NIST recommended curves are faster than the
implementations of general curves. However, these designs are not compatible to any
other prime numbers. Hence, NIST based EC scalar multiplier designs are not flexible
to support any prime numbers of the chosen bit sizes. Moreover, scalability of these
designs is also a major problem. For example, it is not easy to extend a 192-bit EC
scalar multiplier over NIST curves to a multiplier over 224-bit NIST curves.
Virtex-4 implementation of [46] completes a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication in
6.1ms at 43 MHz clock frequency, occupies 20.1K slices and 32 DSPs blocks (16× 16
embedded multipliers). At the top level DA algorithm is used for EC scalar multipli-
cation operation. It is 2.2 times slower than the proposed design, and it also lacks
the ability to resist timing and simple power analysis attacks. [47] extends the design
in [46] to increase performance and side channel attacks resistivity. Its implementa-
tion on a Virtex-6 computes an EC scalar multiplication between 0.3ms to 3.91ms for
192 to 512-bits prime modulus p. It occupies 11.2K slices (33K LUTs), 289 DSPs blocks
(18× 18 multipliers), and 128 RAMB36 (36K random access memory). On the same
platform it consumes the same amount of FPGA slices as compared to our design, note
that it does not include the logic utilization of 289 DSPs and the 128 RAM36 blocks,
moreover its flexibility is only limited to the NIST recommend curves.
Designs in [60], [63] and [71] support general prime field, with p ≤ 256-bits,
however these designs are either based on double-and-add (DA) or non-adjacent-form
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(NAF) techniques to perform EC scalar multiplication. Using the DA method, an n-
bit EC scalar multiplication takes (n) PD + d n2e PA, whereas using NAF, it costs (n)
PD + d n3e PA which is almost 33% decrease in PA operations as compared to the DA
method. However, as data dependencies and computational complexities of PD and
PA are different therefore, these methods are very susceptible to side channel attacks
(even vulnerable against timing and simple power analysis (SPA) attacks). The design
presented in this thesis is superior to these in terms of resistivity to timing and SPA
attacks.
In [56], propose an elliptic curve scalar multiplier architecture over general prime
field resilient to timing and power analysis attacks. The design performs PD and PA
operations using affine coordinates (x , y) which also require modular inversion/divi-
sion operations in addition to the field addition, subtraction, and multiplication. Its
arithmetic unit employs two modular addition, two modular subtraction, two modular
multiplication, and two modular division units. The Virtex-4 FPGA implementation of
the design computes a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication in 7.7 ms, cycle count of 330K,
runs at a maximum clock frequency of 43 MHz, and occupies 20.1K slices. The design
presented in this thesis (DAA using four R4PIM multipliers) on the same platform is
2.25 times faster and consumes only 1.8 times more Virtex-4 FPGA slices. The increase
in slice area is mainly due to the parallel multiplier units, whereas [56] employs se-
rial radix-2 multiplier. The design in [56] also requires 1.92 times more clock cycles
to compute a single EC scalar multiplication operation as compared to the presented
design.
The design reported in [55] proposes a compact programmable arithmetic unit
(PAU) to perform finite field arithmetic operations. Then, an EC scalar multiplier
architecture is presented based on dual instances of the PAU. EC points are represented
in affine coordinates, and Montgomery laddering method for EC scalar multiplication
is adopted to perform PD and PA operations in parallel. Its implementation on Virtex-
2 pro completes a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication in 9.38 ms, achieves maximum
frequency of 36 MHz, cycle count of 338K, and consumes 12K slices. In [55] (Table
XIV) only timing results of its implementation on Virtex-4 are also given, which show
that, it completes a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication in 6.26 ms, which is 2.23 times
slower, and its cycle count is 1.97 times higher as compared to the presented design
on the same Virtex-4 platform.
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As in Table 5.4 implementation results of the EC scalar multiplier in affine coordi-
nates are presented. Using DA method, a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication is completed
in 2.6 ms and consumes 4807 Virtex-6 FPGA slices in 336,256 clock cycles. On the
other hand, Table 5.14 shows the same bit length operation on the same FPGA de-
vice using projective coordinates is completed in 1.69 ms and consumes 9370 Virtex-6
FPGA slices in 242,004 clock cycles, which is almost 1.54 times faster than the affine
coordinates implementation. However, due to integration of multiple copies of the
R4PIM multipliers in projective coordinates, its area consumption is 1.94 times of the
implementation in affine coordinates. Similar conclusions can be made for the DAA
method in affine and projective coordinates. Therefore, projective coordinates offers
better performance which relies only on the performance of a finite field multiplier. In
the case of affine coordinates, optimization of a finite field multiplier and a divider is
important to boost the overall performance.
Most of the available high-speed EC scalar multiplier designs on FPGA platforms
extensively use dedicated built-in blocks such as digital signal processing (DSP) and
embedded multipliers. This research work does not use these embedded blocks except
look-up-tables and the fast carry chains (FCC) of the FPGA is used to reduce the long
carry propagation delay in an adder circuit. Hence, presented designs in this work are
more portable to other FPGA devices and ASIC technologies.
All of the designs in Table 5.14 are based on standard elliptic curve representa-
tion (Weierstrass). The number of Underlying field operations to compute PD and PA
operations are more than the some other forms of ECs. Recent advances in EC cryptog-
raphy is to perform scalar multiplication on new forms of EC other than the Weierstrass
form. Examples of these are Edwards curves [115], Twisted Edwards curves [116],
Montgomery curves [117, 118]. These curves require fewer field multiplications to
compute PD and PA operations as compared to the curves in Weierstrass form [29].
Therefore computation time of scalar multiplication on these curves are lower than
the standard Weierstrass form. Some of these curves have unified formula for PD and
PA [116], thus they may have inherent resistance for different side channel attacks.
Hardware analysis of these curves are reported in [43,70,130]. Despite their numer-
ous advantages these curves are not standardized yet. Presented designs for low level
field operations and EC scalar multiplication in this work supports general prime field
which means that these designs are flexible to work for any prime number p. There-
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fore, the presented architectures for finite field arithmetic in this work can be utilized
to construct elliptic curve cryptographic processors over several new forms of elliptic
curves [74].
It is worth mentioning that most of the designs in Table 5.14 including the archi-
tectures presented in this thesis are not capable of resisting differential power analysis
attacks [32]. DPA tries to reveal the secret by monitoring several power traces and find
patterns by applying some statistical methods.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter introduces novel hardware architectures to compute the EC point mul-
tiplication operation over general prime field. Two EC scalar multiplication algo-
rithms, double-and-add and double-and-always-add are implemented. The chapter
first presents hardware architectures for EC scalar multiplication algorithms by using
affine coordinates representation of the EC points. As in affine coordinates the scope of
parallelism in the underlying field operations is very limited therefore multiple copies
of an arithmetic unit can not accelerate the respective operations. The division oper-
ation required to compute EC PA and PD operations in affine coordinates also limits
the performance of an EC scalar multiplier in affine coordinates.
This chapter also presents an EC scalar multiplier architecture using projective
coordinates. In projective coordinates EC PD and PA operations are inversion/division
free, and there are also opportunities to exploit parallelism in the computation of EC
PD and PA operations. A number of modular multipliers are used in the design of the
arithmetic unit to exploit the available parallelism.
The presented architectures are synthesised targeting Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA plat-
form. Using the DA algorithm and employing three multipliers, a 256-bit EC scalar
multiplication can be computed in 1.69 ms in a cycle count of 242K. When four mul-
tipliers are employed the computation time for the same operation is reduced to 1.47
ms with a cycle count of 208.1K. Similarly, using the DAA algorithm and employing
four multipliers, computation time for a 256-bit EC scalar multiplication operation is
1.46 ms in a cycle count of 206.59K.
118
5.8. CONCLUSION
The synthesis results confirm that the EC scalar multiplier presented in this thesis
is a good trade-offs of performance and flexibility. The other major advantage of the
proposed designs using DAA method is the ability to counter side channel attacks based
on timing and simple power consumption analysis of the cryptographic device.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
The contribution of this research work is mainly comprises of efficient hardware ar-
chitectures for finite arithmetic operations including addition, subtraction, multiplica-
tion, and division. Based on these optimized arithmetic primitives, high performance
hardware architectures for elliptic curve scalar multiplication operation are proposed.
Chapter 2 discusses essential background knowledge of elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy (ECC) which establishes that an elliptic curve (EC) scalar multiplication is the
fundamental operation in the construction of ECC based crypto-systems. In this re-
gards, common optimization techniques and available hardware implementations of
EC scalar multiplication are analysed.
In Chapter 3, strategies to perform addition, subtraction, multiplication and divi-
sion in a finite field of prime characteristics are discussed. Hardware architectures
to execute these basic finite field operations are also presented. For finite field in-
version/division, the extended Euclidean algorithm is adopted while the interleaved
modular multiplication algorithm is used to perform a finite field multiplication. Fi-
nite field multiplication is a core operation in all public key based cryptosystems. The
performance of these cryptosystems can be significantly enhanced by incorporating an
optimized finite field multiplier. Therefore, this chapter also presents modifications to
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the interleaved modular multiplication algorithm based on radix-4, radix-8 and Booth
encoding techniques. Subsequently, efficient finite field multiplier architectures are
presented based on the modified interleaved modular multiplication algorithms.
In Chapter 4, the finite field multipliers presented in Chapter 3 are further op-
timized by introducing parallelism to perform critical operations concurrently. Due
to the introduced parallelism, the parallel finite field multipliers have shorter critical
path delays and are able to achieve higher operating clock frequencies. Then, the per-
formance of these parallel multipliers are evaluated on the basis of computation time,
resource consumption, throughput and operating frequency.
Chapter 5 presents hardware architectures to execute EC scalar multiplications.
The underlying finite field operations to perform an EC scalar multiplication operation
in affine coordinates are modular addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
Therefore, the arithmetic unit in an EC scalar multiplier design is comprised of mod-
ular addder/subtractor, modular multiplier and modular divider units. On the system
level the standard double-and-add (DA) and double-and-always-add (DAA) methods
are adopted to perform an EC scalar multiplication operation. In the DA algorithm
point addition and point doubling operations can not be performed concurrently. On
the other hand the DAA algorithm provides a flexibility to execute these point addition
and doubling operations in parallel. Therefore, in the implementation of the EC scalar
multiplier using the DAA algorithm, two arithmetic units are incorporated to execute
point addition and doubling operations concurrently.
As the computational complexity of a modular division operation is more than a
modular multiplication, the standard projective coordinates are used to remove this
division operation from the computation of EC group operations. At the end of an
EC scalar multiplication operation in projective coordinates, two division operations
are needed to convert the result back to affine coordinates. This work uses the stan-
dard projective coordinate system to perform these point operations. In projective
coordinates, there are many opportunities to execute the underlying field operations
in parallel. Therefore, the EC scalar multiplier using standard projective coordinates
employs different numbers of parallel multipliers. A performance evaluation is pre-
sented based on computation time, resource consumption and throughput. Using the
DA method, performance is evaluated by employing three and four parallel multipli-
ers and for the DAA method, performance is shown for the architectures using four
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modular multipliers. Finally, comparison with state-of-the-art designs in the literature
is presented which shows that the architectures proposed in this work are good trade-
offs between performance and flexibility. The presented designs provide the flexibility
for the user to select a prime number and the EC parameters. Therefore, the user can
update these parameters to avoid any security breach.
Implementation results of EC scalar multipliers based on the other modular mul-
tipliers presented in Chapter 4 are given in Appendix A.
6.2 Future Work
There are several possible extensions of the work presented in this thesis. Some of
these are highlighted below.
• In this thesis, the fast carry chains (FCC) of FPGA are used to reduce long carry
propagation delay in adders. An important extension of the work presented in
this thesis is to design a high-speed adder circuit incorporating different fast
addition techniques such as carry save addition, redundant signed digit addi-
tion etc. Then analyse the performance of modular multipliers and EC scalar
multipliers based on the high-speed adder.
• Resource requirements of high-radix parallel modular multipliers presented in
Chapter 4 are significantly higher than their radix-2 counterparts. One possible
future direction is to eliminate redundant operations to optimize the resource
consumption of higher-radix parallel modular multipliers.
• The general side-channel attack is based on timing and is known as the timing
attack. The EC scalar multiplier design in this work is resilient to this attack by
using the DAA method to compute the EC scalar multiplication operation. Side-
channel attack based on power consumption has been categorized into simple
power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). SPA uses a single
trace of power consumption and the DAA method is resistant to this type of at-
tacks. On the other hand DPA uses statistical analysis of several power traces and
the DAA method is not resistant to the DPA attacks. Randomization techniques
are recommended to defeat DPA [131]. Therefore, one possible future direction
is to add resistance to DPA attacks in the presented architectures in this work.
122
6.2. FUTURE WORK
• Several new forms of EC curves have been proposed such as Edwards, twisted
Edwards, Montgomery, etc. These curves require fewer number of underlying
arithmetic operations and are considered more secure against different side-
channel attacks as compared to the curves presented in the other Weierstrass
form. Thus, point multiplication operations over these curves are faster than
the Weierstrass form. As the presented modular multipliers work for any general
prime number, therefore, a possible future extension is to design an EC scalar
multiplier to perform point multiplication operations over these new forms of
EC curves.
• Modern FPGAs are equipped with different high speed components such as dig-
ital signal processing (DSP) blocks, block RAMs (BRAM) depending on vendors
and device type, a DSP block integrates an integer multiplier of different sizes.
For example, the Virtex-6 DSP block incorporates a 25×18-bit multiplier. A pos-
sible future extension of the work is to use these built-in FPGA components in
the design of point multiplier over standard and the new forms of ECs.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Implementation results of EC scalar multiplier us-
ing modular multipliers presented in Chapter 4
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A.1. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF EC SCALAR MULTIPLIER USING MODULAR
MULTIPLIERS PRESENTED IN CHAPTER 4
Table A.1: Number of clock cycles required for EC scalar
multiplication in projective coordinates
Latency (Tn) EC scalar Multiplier
R4BIM (bn/2c+ 3)
DAa [n(2n+ 16) + bn/2c(3n+ 16)] + 4n
DAb [n(2n+ 13) + bn/2c(3n/2+ 14)] + 4n
DAAb n(3n+ 35) + 4n
R8BIM (bn/3c+ 5)
DAa [n(4n/3+ 29) + bn/2c(2n+ 33)] + 4n
DAb [n(4n/3+ 23) + bn/2c(5n/3+ 27)] + 4n
DAAb n(2n+ 38) + 4n
R8PIM (bn/3c+ 7)
DAa [n(4n/3+ 37) + bn/2c(2n+ 41)] + 4n
DAb n(4n+ 31) + bn/2c(5n/3+ 37) + 4n
DAAb n(2n+ 55) + 4n
R4BPIM (bn/2c+ 3)
DAa [n(2n+ 16) + bn/2c(3n+ 16)] + 4n
DAb [n(2n+ 13) + bn/2c(3n/2+ 14)] + 4n
DAAb n(3n+ 24) + 4n
R8BPIM (bn/3c+ 5)
DAa [n(4n/3+ 29) + bn/2c(2n+ 33)] + 4n
DAb n(4n/3+ 25) + bn/2c(5n/3+ 27) + 4n
DAAb n(2n+ 40) + 4n
∗ Double-and-Add (DA)
∗ Double-and-always-add (DAA)
∗ Three parallel multipliers (a)
∗ Four parallel multipliers (b)
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MULTIPLIERS PRESENTED IN CHAPTER 4
Table A.2: Cycle count of EC scalar multiplication using DA algorithm
and three multipliers in projective coordinates
Field size Point doubling Point addition EC scalar multiplication
R4BIM
192-any 400 592 133, 632
224-any 464 688 180, 992
256-any 528 784 235, 520
R8BIM
192-any 285 417 94, 752
224-any 328 481 127, 344
256-any 371 545 164, 736
R8PIM
192-any 293 425 97, 056
224-any 336 489 130, 032
256-any 371 553 167, 808
R4BPIM
192-any 400 592 133, 632
224-any 464 688 180, 992
256-any 528 784 235, 520
R8BPIM
192-any 285 417 94, 752
224-any 328 481 127, 344
256-any 371 545 164, 736
EC scalar multiplication (ECSM)
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MULTIPLIERS PRESENTED IN CHAPTER 4
Table A.3: Cycle count of EC scalar multiplication using DA algorithm
and four multipliers in projective coordinates
Field size Point doubling Point addition EC scalar multiplication
R4BIM
192-any 397 302 105, 216
224-any 461 350 142, 464
256-any 525 398 185, 344
R8BIM
192-any 279 347 86, 880
224-any 322 401 117, 040
256-any 365 454 151, 552
R8PIM
192-any 287 357 89, 376
224-any 330 411 119, 952
256-any 373 464 154, 880
R4BPIM
192-any 397 302 105, 216
224-any 461 350 142, 464
256-any 525 398 185, 344
R8BPIM
192-any 279 347 86, 880
224-any 322 401 117, 040
256-any 365 454 151, 552
EC scalar multiplication (ECSM)
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MULTIPLIERS PRESENTED IN CHAPTER 4
Table A.4: Implementation of DAA algorithm using four multipliers in projec-
tive coordinates
Field size Area Freq. (MHz) cycle count Time (ms) TP
R4BIM
192-any 7,853 slices 77 115, 712 1.51 662
224-any 8,718 slices 73 156, 352 2.14 467
256-any 9,505 slices 68 203, 264 2.98 335
R8BIM
192-any 8,569 slices 63 84, 068, 888 1.29 775
224-any 9,426 slices 58 109, 312 1.88 531
256-any 10,585 slices 53 141, 312 2.66 375
R8PIM
192-any 15,565 slices 118 84, 672 0.71 1408
224-any 17,454 slices 112 113, 120 1 1000
256-any 19,361 slices 107 145, 664 1.36 735
R4BPIM
192-any 8,381 slices 131 115, 712 0.88 1136
224-any 8,914 slices 127 156, 352 1.23 813
256-any 10,131 slices 122 203, 264 1.66 602
R8BPIM
192-any 13,781 slices 115 81, 792 0.71 1408
224-any 16,234 slices 110 109, 760 0.99 1000
256-any 17,793 slices 105 141, 824 1.35 735
Throughput (TP), operations per second (ops)
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